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Master Thesis Proposal 
Topic Characteristics: 
My thesis will focus on the impact on the Crimean economy made by its integration in Russia. 
This is a very interesting political economy case-study, which allows us to monitor the process 
of economic development in the region, plagued by the inherited economic misbalances and the 
questionable legal status. In other words it allows seeing how underdeveloped territory ascends 
to the more developed country (like GDR to FRG) while at the same time bearing character traits 
of disputed territory (like Northern Cyprus).  
Up to the moment all studies on Crimea in the period that followed its annexation focus on 
political side of this question (Darczewska, 2014; Jenkins, 2014; Gardner, 2015; Grigas, 2016). I 
am not aware of any other economic studies of this subject existing at the moment; so 
essentially, it is first research of its kind. 
I believe this subject to be important and relevant because the studied region has the following 
characteristics: it is huge in size of territory and population; it is important in political sense – its 
annexation has sparked major international crisis. There are economic researches about 
unrecognized territories like Northern Cyprus or Israel’ settlements on the West Bank – so it is 
justified from scientific point of view to write a research about Crimea. 
Hypothesis: 
1) After more than 20 years of primarily negative economic development on the peninsula 
gap between Crimea and the Russian mainland regions have increased, making it difficult to 
achieve convergence; 
2) Already present negative features of Crimea’s economy coincide with the new factors, 
such as sanctions, thus creating a negative effect on the most of the sectors of economy; 
3) In its approach towards development and integration Russia puts an accent on the huge 
investments, rather than building institutions – at the same time all economic development in 
Crimea depends on the subsidies and crisis management from the mainland; 
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4) After 2 years of being part of Russia de-facto, Crimea did not reach full integration – 
because of the lack of proper infrastructural connection to the Russian mainland and the 
sanctions that prevent major Russian companies and banks from engaging directly in the 
business in Crimea. 
Methodology: 
1) Search for relevant theories and empirical evidences in the following areas: economic 
integration; disputed territories; small island economies; institutions; Russian regional economic 
development;  
2) Study the patterns of Crimea’s economic development before March 2014 by analyzing it 
sector by sector; drew comparisons with the south of Russia and explain differences in the 
models of development; 
3) Analyze the changes in the different sectors of Crimean economy that took place after 
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Abstract: 
This paper researches the changes that took place in Crimean economy after March 2014 with 
respect to the integration policies Russia has applied in that field. Based on the theories of 
economic integration and Russian regional development programs, economic development 
patterns of disputed territories and small island economies, as well as the influence of institutions 
on the economy, we find that ascension to Russia had for the peninsula its positive and negative 
effects with the prevalence of the latter. We also suggest that the political integration of Crimea 
was more successful than it was in economic dimension, because the existing investment 
constraints and lack of proper connection to the Russian mainland remain formidable obstacles 
on the way of region’s successful integration and further development. We find that all economic 
development in Crimea depends on Russian subsidies and it is likely to remain this way because 
the region is underdeveloped by Russian standards. This is consistent with the idea that small 
island economies and disputed territories are over-dependent on the respective sponsor-state for 




Tato práce se zabývá změnami, které se odehrály v krymské ekonomice po březnu 2014 s 
ohledem na integrační politiku Ruska uplatňovanou v této oblasti. Podle mého názoru, 
zakládajícím se na teorii hospodářské integrace a ruských programech regionálního rozvoje, 
vzorech ekonomického rozvoje sporných území a malých ostrovních ekonomik, ale také na vlivu 
institucí na ekonomiku, mělo připojení poloostrova k Rusku některý pozitivní, ale více negativní 
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vliv. Politická integrace Krymu byla úspěšnější než integrace v ekonomickém směru, protože 
stávající investiční omezení a nedostatek odpovídajícího napojení na ruskou pevninu tvoří i 
nadále obrovskou překážku v cestě k úspěšné integraci regionu a k jeho dalšímu rozvoji. Dá se 
říci, že je veškerý ekonomický vývoj Krymu závislý na ruských dotacích, a je pravděpodobné, že 
to tak zůstane i nadále, protože je region na ruské standardy nedostatečně rozvinutý. To 
potvrzuje také teorie, že malé ostrovní ekonomiky a sporná území jsou příliš závislá na 
příslušném sponzorském státu, který jim poskytuje ekonomickou stabilitu. 
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In March 2014 Crimean peninsula, after a short period of being a separatist state and a 
referendum supported by Russian armed forces, became a part of Russian Federation. 
International community recognized neither the referendum, nor the de-facto ascension of the 
region to Russian Federation. This event has sparked major international crisis that remains 
unsolved to that date.  
Annexed Crimea makes an interesting political economy case-study because of its size and 
importance: it’s a large region with more than 2 million people of population; Crimea is located 
in strategically important region of the Black Sea and it serves as base for Russian power 
projection in the region; it was annexed and incorporated by G20 economy and UN Security 
Council member. Bulk of the existing literature on Crimea after annexation focuses on political 
aspect of the problem, but the economic side of developments in annexed Crimea remains 
overlooked. Such neglect is not understandable in the light of research interest presented by this 
subject – economic development of annexed Crimea is arguably one of the most attractive topics 
in the post-Soviet studies, which remains under-researched to that date. In support of this view 
we can point to the examples of other disputed territories like Northern Cyprus, whose 
population, size of economy and geopolitical impact are not bigger than Crimea’s – but all of 
them were studied from economic perspective. 
Studying Crimean economic development today is justified from scientific point of view – 2 
years is the time-span that offers enough possibilities for all sorts of data sources to appear, be it 
independent expert assessments of reports by international bodies. Qualitatively new sources of 
data are not likely to appear in the near future and all further researches in that direction will 
have to make use of sources, which are available now. 
The aim of this dissertation is to study the economic development of Crimea during period from 
March 2014 to March 2016, when the region was undergoing integration in Russia economy. 
This time period was chosen because it exceeds official transition period that has ended in 
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January and allows seeing some lasting tendencies, which are not usually visible in the shorter 
period of observation. 2 years is just enough to get information for a few comparable seasons, 
which analysis will allow making scientifically-grounded conclusions. It can be argued that 
greater period of time is needed so study this subject, but there is a counter-argument that any 
further hesitation will result only in unnecessary time loss. For example, there are already 
scientific articles, studying the impact of Ukrainian crisis on the Russian stock exchange market 
(Nivorozhkin and Castagneto-Gissey, 2016). Existing data with all its imperfection allows 
researching this subject thoroughly and drawing conclusions, which may be later used in that 
field.  
Our research question sounds the following way: how economic integration of Crimea in Russia 
has affected its economic development in the first years after annexation. We argue that 
integration and development in this time frame were inseparable from each other because 
process of adaptation and adjustment of Crimean economy to Russian conditions correlates with 
its performance and there is a strong causation link. For example, real estate sector was given 
boost impossible in Ukrainian conditions, while banking sector shrunk and degraded under new 
circumstances. 
Our method is described as following. First, to outline the relevant archetypes of economic 
development present in 4 different types of economic subjects, that are relevant for our research 
purposes: integrated regions; disputed territories; small-island economies; Russian regions that 
went through development programs. Additional part of theory we use is dealing with the 
economic impact of institutions. Second, to explain described developments that were present 
during studied period with reference to the archetypes of economic development we will 
examine in theoretical framework. Third, to draw conclusions based on the summary of our 
findings.  
The structure of the work is following: 
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1) Chapter 1 deals with theoretical framework and the sources we have used: 
examination and outlining of archetypes relevant for our research goals; 
2) Chapter 2 will explain economic development of Crimea before March 2014 – sector 
by sector. It is needed to highlight later changes that occurred, as the whole trajectory 
of development changed overnight.  Comparison with neighboring Russian region of 
Krasnodar will be presented and explanation of differences will be provided – it will 
serve to the purpose of our later examination of Crimean economy and will help to 
explain why economic development and integration of the region later took the form 
of catching up with the rest of Russia; 
3) Chapter 3 will describe and explain changes that took place in Crimean economy 
during the studied period with the reference to archetypes of development noted 
earlier; 
4) In the conclusion findings will be summarized. 
Chapter 1: Theoretical framework and literature review 
Most of the existing literature on Crimea is centered on political side of the affair (Darczewska, 
2014; Jenkins, 2014; Gardner, 2015; Grigas, 2016), hence theory had to be built from elements, 
that would have relevance in our case. 
1.1 Economic integration. First thing we need to do is to examine the question of economic 
integration, because in the observed period Crimea was being integrated in Russia and both 
processes were inseparable from each other.  
We have used theoretical literature on the subject. Mattli (1999) provides good overview of 
integration efforts through history: in Europe and on other continents. Principal thought for our 
research, based on the analysis of all integration efforts, is that the further economic integration 
and convergence between regions, existing on the different stages of development ultimately 
depends on political decisions made by the actors involved. This corresponds to one of our main 
ideas that the drivers behind Crimea’s economic performance are more of political, than of pure 
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economic nature. Rosamond (2000) have dedicated 3
rd
 chapter of his work to the discussing the 
integration theories (pp. 50-73) with paying special attention to neo-functionalism which is 
relevant in our case because some of its elements are consistent with what we will see in case of 
Crimea and Russia, which were very dependent on each other and by the moment of annexation 
still had had very tight economic ties: economic foundations to the integration and the political 
agenda supporting integration efforts. According to Mattli and Rosamond, any kind of deep 
integration rests upon already existing strong ties between regions involved and the political 
willingness of the respective leadership to strengthen these ties. These factors were evident in 
Crimea – historical dependency of the peninsula on the demand generated in mainland Russia 
and the politically motivated decision of Kremlin to invest in the development and integration of 
the region. 
Additional attention needs to be paid to the parts of integration theory that relate to the 
investments, made by more developed regions to ensure catching up of the least developed 
regions. As we will see later, successful integration and development of Crimea depends on large 
investments from Russia – primarily in infrastructure. In this case it would be of use to support 
this thesis with the examination of similar experience elsewhere. EU cohesion policy would be 
perfect for this purpose. Leonardi (2004) and Molle (2008) offer comprehensive overview of EU 
programs aimed at the promoting convergence between more developed core states of EU and its 
more recent and relatively less developed new member states. The existing evidence suggests 
that enhancement and acceleration of economic integration between regions different in their 
levels of economic development demands sufficient investments from more developed regions. 
With respect to Crimea we conclude that Russia’s plans for infrastructural investments already 
affect regional economic development and will affect it even more in the future – the existing 
evidence from EU cohesion policy experience confirms the idea that such investments have 
positive effect (Bachtler and McMaster, 2007; Farole et al., 2011; Medeiros, 2013; Rodríguez-
Pose and Garcilazo, 2015), though on condition that allocation of funds is effectively supervised 
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(Beugelsdijk and Eijffinger, 2005).  The principal conclusions in this part of our theoretical 
framework should be that economic integration and convergence of different regions demands 
the following: 
 Long-term political commitment; 
 Large investments in order to achieve certain level of convergence between regions, 
which exist on a different level of economic development. 
There is however a very limited use of the literature we mentioned because all of it deals with 
the integration between different countries, which are politically independent from each other 
and choose to enhance cooperation. This is not the case of Crimea which was part of one country 
and then became a part of different one. Since the studied region have changed previous 
jurisdiction and its existing governance hierarchy have shifted to the different sovereign actor, 
there is a need to study how newly integrated regions develop on a nation-state level.   
To further narrow the scope of the research and evade dealing with huge number of suppositions 
and admissions, irrelevant to the research, examined period for examples will be limited to post-
WWII period – otherwise we will have to  deal with such political-economic constructs as 
colonies and protectorates. The fact that Crimea is the first single annexation in Europe after 
WWII gives us more ground for this specification.  
To the date there are few cases fitting our criteria – Germany (integration of GDR) and India 
(annexation of Goa and Sikkim): 
1) Former GDR. There is no shortage of literature on this subject. Available sources can be 
classified in several groups: the ones examining development of the region on the first 
stages of integration, examining differences between two states  (Siebert and Collier-Jr., 
1991; Siebert et al., 1991; Sinn, 1992); those explaining integration issues in 
retrospective (Sinn, 2000; Burda and Hunt, 2001; Burda, 2006); papers, dealing with 
separate sides of reunification such as labor market fluctuations (Lechneret et al., 2005; 
Snower and Merkl, 2006; Uhlig, 2006), regional changes (Büttner and  Rincke, 2004; 
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Redding and Sturm, 2005), improvements in living standards (Frijters et al., 2004; 
Frijters et al., 2004 – 2; Easterlin and Plagnol, 2008) and impact of specific factors such 
as social connections on integration (Burchardi and  Hassan, 2011). 
Germany has the most relevance in this relation because FRG had to deal with integration 
and development of a much less developed territory. «German reunification is 
paradigmatic of the economic integration of any two neighboring regions at different 
levels of economic development» (Burda and Hunt, 2001, p. 2). Approach, taken by 
Germany, is the closest to what could be later examined in Crimea: heavy subsidizing 
and other benefits aiming towards full convergence of the new region with the rest of the 
country. The fact that Eastern Germany’s integration with FRG happened more than 20 
years ago allows to make projections about Crimea’s own trajectory of development – it 
is consistent with our hypothesis that full integration will take a long time and that region 
will remain less developed in comparison with the rest of Russia, like former GDR still 
has to catch up with the west: FRG’s success in narrowing the gap between two regions 
was relative: by 2013 former GDR territories still had weaker industrial base, lower 
income and higher unemployment levels (Bracholdt, 2013); regional GDP levels in 2013 
making up 70% of the Western Germany levels, while federal subsidies still play an 
important part in regional economy (Wagstyl, 2013). Big subsidies and other expenditure 
policies also play crucial part in Crimea’s development and integration with Russia, so 
Germany is the good case-study for our research. 
2) Goa and Sikkim. For Goa chosen sources can be grouped in the following catergories: 
those dealing with general economic overview of the region (Newman, 1984; Giri, 2009; 
Do Ceu Rodrigues, 2009; Urankar, 2013) and particular important industries such as 
mining (D’Mello, 2015), agriculture (Vanjari, 1969; Rubinoff, 2001), tourism 
(Routledge, 2000). The same division can be applied to literature about Sikkim: general 
overview (Gupta, 1975; Karan, 1987) and analysis of certain industries – which in case of 
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Sikkim is limited to agriculture (Arora, 2007 and 2008; Chakrabarti, 2010; Tambe et al., 
2012). 
Sikkim and Goa are relevant because the few details of their ascension to India and 
further development make parallels to Crimea: they were obtained with the use of 
military force; visible presence of tourist sector; entrenchment of local governing elites; 
redistribution of land and other resources, that hurts minorities; their economic 
development depended on provision of investment schemes and other economic 
incentives by the federal center. The differences were solid too: their international status 
of integral part of India was not challenged; their economic development after ascension 
to India was based on the switch from agriculture as the main form of employment to 
other sectors; these regions were less dependent on the federal subsidies. 
To sum up this part, we have found evidence that in similar cases political commitment and 
generous investments (even when the ascending region is more or less developed – like Goa) are 
necessary conditions for the economic integration of the new region. 
1.2 Disputed territories. International status of Crimea is one of the important factors of its 
economic development; hence addressing researches in that area would be of use for our 
research. The closest analogy to Crimea would be unrecognized states and annexed territories. 
For the purpose of determining what an unrecognized state is we used general literature on the 
subject of unrecognized states to extract the characteristic features of such kind of territorial 
entities (Baev, 1998; Pegg, 1998; Lynch, 2004; Kolsto, 2006; Rywkin, 2006; Stanislawski, 2008; 
Caspersen, 2012). Such are the following: 
 Unrecognized state covers most of the territory it claims, including its main cities; 
 It lacks broad international recognition;  
 They have large risks of resumption of the armed conflict around their status; 
 Such entity has to exist in the status it claims for some period of time – minimum 2 years. 
This is an argument, shared by 2 researchers (Kolsto, 2006; Caspersen, 2012) and serves 
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as additional support for our choice of topic, because 2-years span is the current time of 
Crimea being outside Ukraine. 
Mentioned sources deal with the political side of the question, while we are interested in the 
economic development of unrecognized states. Most of the research in that narrow area is 
country-specific, so we can refer only to one particular article by Martin Riegl, an expert on the 
issues of such states (Riegl, 2014), which concludes that lack of recognition alters their 
economic development to the worst. Such conclusion alone is obviously not enough for further 
use and we had to take some country-specific studies that suit our purposes. 
To choose among huge amount of various separatist groups and unrecognized territorial entities, 
we needed to establish certain criteria for comparable territories, which would meet our research 
purpose – to examine Crimea’s economic performance after its annexation by Russia: 
 Fitting the crucial criteria of such entities – control over most of claimed territory and de-
facto political independence from the country from which it ceded;  
 Having a sponsor-state – like Crimea in its current status could exist only with Russian 
support, so the studied analogue has too; 
 Studied unrecognized entity should exist up to the date – we are unaware when or if 
Crimea will become the integral part of Ukraine again, hence the analogous case had to 
be present as continuous, not as something accomplished; 
 Studied unrecognized entity must lack wide international recognition or the history of 
such.  
With having this criteria we were able to concentrate on studying 5 unrecognized states 
(Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Northern Cyprus) and 2 annexed 
territories (Israeli territories on the West Bank, Western Sahara).  
Here we will shortly discuss the chosen case-studies and the relevant literature: 
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1) Abkhazia and South Ossetia. General information about economic life in these states was 
found in the general researches on the unrecognized states in the region (Popescu, 2006; 
Kolossov and  O'Loughlin, 2011; Bakke et al., 2014). 
2) Transnistria. Literature can be divided in the following groups: functioning of the 
economy (Burla et al., 2005; Chamberlain-Creanga and Allin, 2010; Allin, 2011; 
Isachenko, 2012; Balmaceda, 2013; Bakke et al., 2014) and external economic 
interactions of the region (Popescu , 2006; Luecke et al., 2011; Prohnitchi and Lupusor , 
2013; O'Loughlin et al., 2013). 
3) Nagorno-Karabakh. Economic development of Nagorno-Karabakh has attracted less 
attention than the political aspect of this unresolved conflict, but some literature still 
exists. There are general papers, dealing with region’s economic circumstances (Sharrow, 
2007; Terterov and Niculescu, 2012) and articles concerning the political aspects of the 
problem, but providing valuable insights into its economic life (Potier, 2000; Champain, 
2005; Kolsto and Blakkisrud, 2008; Hopmann and Zartman, 2013). 
4) Northern Cyprus. There is no shortage of researches, which could be structured in 2 
groups: those examining economic dependency of the region on its sponsor-state 
(Gunsel, 2006; Feridun et al., 2011; Feridun, 2014) and those dealing with region’s 
overall economic performance (Özyigit, 2008; Mihci and  Karaman, 2009; Katircioglu, 
2010; Isachenko, 2012; Gorgulu, 2014; Karavelioğlu, 2014; Yorucul and Mehmet, 2014). 
5) Israeli territories on the West Bank. This is the subject with the bigger number of 
researches. Most of it deals with explaining political economy of settlements (Arnon and 
Weinblatt, 2001; Farsakh, 2002; Lagerquist, 2003; Roy, 2004; Khalidi and Taghdisi-Rad, 
2009; Hareuveni, 2010; Hareuveni, 2011; Kanafani and Ghaith, 2012); economic 
consequences of occupation (IMF, 2010; PMNE and ARIJ, 2011; UN, 2012; Koek, 2013; 
World Bank, 2013; World Bank, 2015; HRW, 2016); place of Arab parts in the economy 
of occupied territories (Farsakh, 2002 – 2; Rosenhek, 2003; Gordon, 2008; Khalil, 2009; 
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Ryder, 2013; WPO, 2013); external economic interactions of the occupied territories 
(FIDH et al., 2012; QCEA, 2012; World Bank, 2012; Tonutti, 2013; Lovatt and Toaldo, 
2015); some chronological works on the development of settlements (Gorenberg, 2007; 
Zertal and Eldar, 2009). 
6) Western Sahara. Morocco de-facto administers this region, though its international status 
is questionable and remains disputed. The level of economic development of the region is 
not very high in comparison to other studied regions and it did not attract attention of 
economic researchers, so the relevant information had to be drawn from political briefs 
(Lamadieu, 2012; Arieff, 2014;) and the articles from the editions specializing on the 
regional studies (Rubin, 2015).  
From what we could learn out of these examples, we will outline the most common patterns of 
economic development of such territories to use them later to explain described changes in 
Crimean economy. There are 2 groups of factors, affecting economic development of all of these 
studied territories: external and constructional. First one means those imposed by country 
supporting their existence or by outside actors, the second describes natural structural traits 
accompanying their development. 
External factors:  
 Economy of disputable territories could exist and develop only with the help of sponsor-
state; 
 The legal position, recognition and de-facto status of newly annexed or absorbed 
territories depends on capability of their sponsor-states to negotiate and ensure their 
existence;  
 Economy of unrecognized territories is vulnerable before external political factors, such 
as war and sanctions – all of the examined regions had suffered from these in different 




 Unrecognized territories have serious problems with the establishment and nostrification 
of property rights due to the violent nature of events preceding their founding; 
 Such territories suffer from disruption in legitimate trade and investment; 
 They are still able to establish de-facto presence in the world economy by informal and 
illegal means. As we will later see from Crimean example, economic activity on such 
territories remains connected to the economies of region, though in formally illegal way; 
 Such territories usually have booming shadow economy, sometimes due to the criminal 
nature of the state, sometimes due to the need to find substitution for the otherwise absent 
goods and services; 
 All unrecognized entities have some population group supporting their de-facto status – it 
could be those who took part in militarized secession or those who benefited from the 
later privatization or other forms of economic redistribution. 
Some attention will be paid to the Crimean Tatars community because they played pivotal role in 
the blockade of Crimea (which was disruptive to some of the sectors we observe) and they play 
important role in the development of the constructional sector. There are works studying this 
community in historical perspective (Fisher, 1978; Uehling, 2004; Williams, 2015), which are 
good for building an understanding of the principal problems this community faces and the 
issues it has with the central government on the mainland (in the periods we highlight that would 
be Ukraine and Russia). There are certain problems this community encounters on the peninsula 
since March 2014 and as we will see later – most of them already were present during the 
Ukrainian period. In political science Michael Mann tended to explain common phenomenon of 
ethnical discrimination as the part of the process of transition: societies which are happening 
undergoing change from totalitarian regime to democracy are inclined towards discriminating 
and attacking minorities, which were actually or allegedly connected to the fallen regime (Mann, 
2004). In economic sense this theory can be applied to many communities, that have suffered in 
the process of transition – such occasions took place in the most of our examples from the 
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integrated regions and questionable entities, with the only exception of former Eastern Germany. 
In case of territories with questionable status possible explanation could be that what first 
seemed as temporary state became a status quo – which due to the reasons explained above was 
tolerable to minorities much less than the immediate aftermath of occupation: the new socio-
economic reality became stronger and occupants entrenched economically, making it clear that 
discriminative policies and unfair practices are to stay. It accelerates if minority is not accepting 
new political order – which is true in case of Arab population in the West Bank, displaced 
Georgians in Southern Caucasus separatist republics, Greek Cypriots from the north or even 
Lepchas in Sikkim and some distant rural communities in Goa. In case of newly integrated 
territories it would be economical issues: in Goa and Sikkim economic interests of the elites of 
the territory which exists in the new political reality sooner or later colludes with interests of 
smaller group – like rural communities in India. The minority does not have to be ethnical in 
principal, though it is the form of discrimination we can encounter more often than other ones. 
Taking into account all of that, we argue that community’s problems on the peninsula have 
primarily economic reasons at the roots. 
1.3 Small island economies. As peninsula Crimea is connected to the continent by land, after 
annexation it became de-facto an island because it has land border only with Ukrain. Crimean 
economic model traditionally has shown over-dependency on the mainland. Issues of integration 
and international status of Crimea are not fully explaining the natural weaknesses of this region, 
which were present in its economy before annexation and influence it now. Also, as we will see 
later, Crimean economy has many features of small island economies: 
 It is dependent on the mainland in economic sense: it needs demand generated on 
the mainland, investments, steady supplies of raw materials and energy etc.; 
 Tourism plays an important role.  
This issue was well-researched, so in order to take out only the most relevant sources, 
generalized works were analyzed. One of the best resources was Professor Lino Briguglio, the 
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specialist on the small island economies. His works and the ones written in collaboration with 
other authors are examining vulnerabilities facing such economies (Briguglio, 1995; Briguglio, 
and Galea, 2003; Briguglio et al., 2006, 2009, 2010) and they lead to conclusion that small island 
economy cannot survive without mainland. Other researcher, Professor Jerome L. McElroy has 
written on the subject himself or in collaboration with other authors are examining small island 
economies in from regional perspective and his findings confirm those of  Briguglio (McElroy, 
2006; McElroy and Mitchell, 2011; McElroy and Medek, 2012). Works by other authors support 
this point of view (Lockhart, 1993; Easterly and Kraay, 2000; Pellinga and Uittob, 2001; 
Hampton and Christensen, 2002; Bertram, 2004; Read, 2004; Sinclair et al, 2004; Brown and 
Leeves, 2007; Prasada et al, 2007; van der Velde et al, 2007; Nunkooa and Ramkissoon, 2010; 
Jayaraman, 2011; Seetanah, 2011; Vella, 2011). 
1.4 Institutions and economic development. Another part of theoretical framework is related to 
the quality of institutions, which is important in case of Crimea where new Russian government 
literally transferred Ukrainian administration and put few Moscow-related supervisors to oversee 
the process. Hence, the important question is that whether the ongoing development is 
qualitatively different from what was happening in Crimea before annexation. 
Acemoglu and Johnson in their famous work «Why nations fail» (2013) study the way how 
institutions determine the level of economic development. Their approach is very close to what 
we are seeking to do in this research – they compare bordering regions (for example, US and 
Mexican parts of the same Nogales region) and point out to the differences that have made their 
levels of economic development to differ so much. In short, Acemoglu and Johnson argue that 
more effective and responsible state, accountable before population can become a driver of 
economic growth, if it will build inclusive political and economic institutions.  This is a strong 
argument, which is supported by other researchers (Putterman, 2013). Though Russia and 
Ukraine were parts of the same country 25 years later, but as we will see later, Russia became 
relatively more developed than Ukraine in that respect. This fact might have affected economic 
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development of Crimea inside independent Ukraine.  The studies of the economic effect of 
institutions in other countries support these findings: comparison of performance between states 
of India with different historical background (Iyer, 2010), CEE regions of former Habsburg 
empire (Becker and Woessmann, 2011) and between former British and French parts of now 
independent and united Cameroon (Lee and Schultz, 2012) confirm that historically conditioned 
institutional differences may be felt between neighboring regions inside one country or on the 
transnational scale.  
We should keep in mind that the gap in institutional quality between Russia and Ukraine is not 
high enough, and the differences in the development of neighboring regions were also the result 
of Russia’s much bigger internal market and overall higher levels of economic development in 
comparison to Ukraine. However, we have paid attention to this part of institutional studies. It is 
proved that in the long-term perspective better political institution are decisive for economic 
development (Flachaire et al., 2014). The problem of corruption is strong, but as de Vaal and 
Ebben (2011) have pointed out, the corruption itself should be seen as the factor interacting with 
other factors – thus, not being fully damaging for economic growth, as long as some other 
institutions are working. Wedeman’s classification of corruptions regimes into «looters», «rent-
scrapers» and «dividend-collectors» (1997) was also helpful in this respect as the way to 
distinguish between the most and least damaging types of political corruption. In case of Russia 
as a more rich country we could find use of the argument made by Law, Lim and Ismail (2013) 
that in low income countries economic gains foster better institutions. Taking into account that 
we will analyze performance in the territory which have went through the long period of 
stagnation and recession, we can’t neglect Rodríguez-Pose argument (2013) that «institutional 
factors» (such as infrastructure, skills etc.) may be even more challenging as an obstacle on the 
way of economic development. This point of view is supported by Siddiqui and Ahmed (2013) 
who has found that for the developing economies solving the immediate institutional economic 
problems may be even more important than establishing the risk-limiting institutions such as 
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independent judges and effective regulation. This is consistent with our summary of Russian 
regional development programs and the approach that is apparently used by Russian government 
in the process of integrating and developing Crimea – first, narrowing the gap between it and 
more developed regions from the Russian mainland. 
As the part of explanation why Crimea lagged behind the rest of Ukraine and suffered from 
stagnation and recession for the better part of its post-1991 history we use the suggestion that 
delayed privatization in the region could be of the components of the problem. In order to 
support this point of view we searched through extensive literature on the privatization effects in 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Most of the 
authors agree (Aghion and Blanchard, 1998; Megginson and Netter, 2001; Djankov and Murrell, 
2002; Andreff , 2006; Brownet al., 2006; Estrin et. al., 2009; Mickiewicz, 2010; Driffield et al., 
2013) that privatization had a positive effect on the performance and efficiency of the enterprises 
involved – this effect was found in the neighboring Ukrainian regions and was absent in Crimea, 
where privatization was largely delayed until the early 2000s. Delayed privatization might have 
been one of the reasons of why economy of peninsula during 1990s shrunk and productivity of 
enterprises fell. 
To understand complexities of Crimea’s later development inside Russia it will be justified to 
address the more particular institutional questions crucial for economic development. Most of the 
researchers working in that area agree that the principal thing for further economic development 
is the level of protection of property rights (Williamson, 2000; Dyck, 2001; Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2005), which consists of 2 parts: guarantees from the expropriation of the assets by 
political actors and judicial-regulatory responsiveness to the issues of property owners.  When 
the working institutions of that kind are absent they are being replaced with more informal 
institutions, that substitute the legitimate official ones (Olson, 2000) – and this category includes 
illegal groups, such as mafia (Varese, 2005). This is consistent with our observations that 
Crimea, as the territory with unrecognized status, will suffer of the following problems: 
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problems with the establishment of property rights and the ensuing problem with their 
protection; high level of informal and illicit relationships in the economy. 
We are making the point that Crimea’s quality of institutions was not exceptionally high before 
annexation and it did not improve after annexation because the very legal status of the region 
today puts all of its economic transactions in the shadowy area. 
1.5 Russian experience in regional economic development. Integration and economic 
development of Crimea took the form of «catching up» with the rest of Russia due to peninsula’s 
underdevelopment, hence it would be justified to summarize Russian experience in the area of 
regional development programs: by 2010 there were 108 programs of economic and social 
development in 65 regions of Russia (Pertsov, 2010, p. 192). 
In Russia top 10 regions account for more than 50% of total GDP in basic prices, which forced 
the government to apply number of regional development programs to narrow the gap between 
the most developed and least developed regions (Farra et al., 2013, p. 2-15). In case of 
depressive republics of North Caucasus (Farra et. al., 2013, p. 15) it helped to increase GRP and 
living standards, though it did not help to build self-sufficient and sustainable local economies, 
which would be independent from the federal subsidies. The list of FDI-attractive regions have 
changed little – fossil-reach regions benefited from the spike in gas and oil prices while 
traditional centers like Moscow and Saint-Petersburg kept their positions (Ledyaeva , 2009). 
There are very few regional success stories in post-Soviet Russia – among them is Krasnodar 
Krai, which will be examined later, and Novgorod (Petro, 2001; 2006). The latter is an example 
of importance of institutional factor for the successful long-term economic development. The 
survey of business-governors relations in Russia (Sharafutdinova and Kisunko, 2014) shows that 
despite the fact that the decision-making in country remains centralized, economic development 
in the region relies heavily on the quality of local governance. In that respect local governing 
authorities have relative autonomy as long as they remain political loyal (Stavrakis et al., 1997; 
Stoner-Weiss, 1997; Kirkow, 1998) – that makes the economic development of the region 
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dependent on the economic qualification of the governing authority, which may turn out to be 
high enough or the opposite. The latter is arguably not the case in Kremlin’s strategy of 
allocation of funds for the regional development.  
Assessment  of 10 years of regional development in Russia by the Russian expert Natalya 
Zubarevich (2009) shows that though the depressive regions have improved their situation 
thanks to federal development programs and generous subsidies, they did not become self-
sufficient and are unable to provide themselves with the same level of financing of their needs. 
Despite all efforts of equalizing, the divergence between the most developed and least developed 
regions in Russia just grew with years (Lehmann and Silvagni, 2013). This leads us to 
conclusion that the primary goal of Kremlin is to keep the subsidized region on the lifeline, 
satisfying its optimum minimum level of subsistence in order to prevent the undesirable social 
clash. It is consistent with our findings in Crimea where Kremlin did nothing to improve 
governing institutions and build sustainable development agenda, but concentrated on the 
ensuring the population’s access to the acceptable minimum of services, which would be enough 
to prevent the humanitarian catastrophe and bring the new region’s economic standards a little 
bit closer to those of mainland Russia.  It has distant similarity to the case of Eastern Germany, 
which after many years of subsidization and improvement of institutions remains economically 
dependent on the western regions. That allows us to conclude that under the existing system 
there will be severe economic mismatches in Crimea between the high investments from the 
federal center and the very low returns.   
Review of sources. Search for resources on Crimea was complicated. Even in the years 
preceding information there was insufficient research activity in that area. But nevertheless 
certain credible sources could be found. First of all that would be resource BlackSeaNews, which 
is headed by Ukrainian economists Andrei Klimenko and Tatiana Guchakova. Their series of 
articles summarizing results of economic development of Crimea within Ukraine was invaluable 
(Guchakova and Klimenko, 2012, 1-5) for this research. The cited series of articles is based on 
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the number of researches, published by Ukrainian think-tank Razumkov Centre (2011). Later, 
after annexation, both experts took critical stance towards new authorities and were persecuted – 
that is an indirect confirmation of their unbiased position since data presented and analyzed by 
them was of huge importance for us. Where appropriate, official Crimean and Russian sources 
were used – such as Ministry of Economic Development of Republic of Crimea (MERRK, 2015-
2016), State Statistics Committee of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Resorts and Tourism of 
Republic of Crimea (MKTRK, 2013). We have also extensively used the reports of Foundation 
for National Energy Safety (FNEB, 2015) and the Crimean expert group «Crimean Project» (CP 
1-3, 2015), which were very useful as Russian side expert assessment of the situation. Concerns 
about biases of such sources are understandable; hence they were extensively used as source of 
data for period preceding annexation – in order to avoid possible controversy. However, Russian 
and Crimean sources in the period after annexation could be used with certain caution, because 
cross-checking with Ukrainian sources reveals that there are no huge distortions between two 
countries in assessment of economic development in Crimea – Ukrainian economic resources 
(such as Krymr, Liga Biznes-Inform, Free Crimea, VoxUkraine, Black Sea News, Insider) are 
not questioning numbers presented by Russian statistics bodies, but concentrate on the political 
and legal aspects of the problem, which are not in the focus of our research. However, mentioned 
sources were invaluable as the way to validate or counter data presented by Russian sources with 
empirical facts and alternative points of view. 
Russian resources, of course, had to be verified through the process of cross-checking and 
combination of critical thinking and common sense. In other words, official data on the 
infrastructural investments could be proven or discarded after checking the claimed results in the 
Internet. Use of independent Russian editions with established credible reputation (Kommersant, 
Vedomosti, RBC, Gazeta.Ru, Slon.Ru) and Russian/Ukrainian outlets of recognized foreign 
medias (Forbes, BBC) was quite important, taking into account problems with the search for data 
– these sources were important as a way of tracking for information and verification of the scarce 
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data, presented by Russian authorities after occupation. When it was possible, information from 
Ukrainian statistics office (State Statistics Committee of the Ukraine, 2011-2016) was used for 
the relevant issues – but unfortunately no official Ukrainian institution decided to cover the 
developments in Crimea after March 2014 (e.g. to count losses of Crimea from switching to 
Russian jurisdiction) to the extent sufficient for using them more often. But that may also serve 
as an indication of Ukrainian subtle recognition of the claimed Crimea’s economic development 
results, which, as we would see later, are far from being a model example. Besides, data and 
facts presented after annexation does not show developments radically different to what has been 
in the process under Ukraine. Russian news agencies (RIA Novosti, Regnum, Lenta, C-Inform) 
and other sources of such kind (such as «Argumenti i fakti» newspaper) were used only where 
they have presented pure factology without analytics or any kind of interpretation to escape 
possible biases.  
For information about construction business and real estate were used works by Russian 
evaluating experts Nikolai and Ilia Pichuev, also the reports from the Ukrainian system of Real 
Estate Market Trading System 1.0 (REM Navigator, 2014-2015). Tourist sector was extensively 
covered and well-researched in Ukraine, in general, and in Crimea particularly in the years 
preceding annexation (Nikolaenko, 1998; Shevchuk, 2009; Jakovenko, 2011). 
English language sources were used where available to support arguments from the main part of 
the research, which remains predominantly in Russian and Ukrainian. Number of credible 
editions was chosen for the references in cases when the proof supporting presented argument 
was available in English (Wall Street Journal, Financial Times, New York Times, The 
Economist, Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs, Forbes, The Guardian, The Telegraph). 
Chapter 2: Economic development of Crimea from 1991 to March 2014 
This part of thesis will deal with the questions concerning economic development of Crimea in 
the period when it was the part of independent Ukraine and up to the de-facto end of Ukrainian 
sovereignty on the peninsula. In the process, comparison with analogous Russian region of 
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Krasnodar Krai will be made. This review will provide basis for understanding why later 
economic integration in Russia and subsequent economic development have taken form of 
catching up with the rest of Russia, when the region has to be heavily subsidized in order to 
narrow the gap the existing gap with the rest of Russia. Summary of economic development in 
the top Crimean industries (such as tourism and agriculture) will be given and, when necessary, 
comparison with the region of Krasnodar will be provided to allow seeing how Crimea 
performed in the regional economic retrospective. Example of Krasnodar Krai is relevant in our 
case because it is positioned in the same Black Sea region, has roughly the same structure of 
economy as Crimea and in the contrast to Crimea provides an insight in to how similar regions 
could develop differently in the two different countries. Such comparison will serve as additional 
evidence, supporting the hypothesis that Crimea is bound to catch-up development in the process 
of being integrated in Russian economy. 
2.1 Macroeconomic governance. After 1991 Crimea retained features of small island economy, 
we have discussed earlier (Briguglio, 1995) – the most important would be over-dependency on 
the «mainland metropoly». Before 1991 the whole USSR was this metropoly, after 1991 its place 
was taken by Ukraine, which due to the reasons we will investigate later, was unable to replace 
only part of what USSR single market and economic system could offer – which explains the 
following degradation and stagnation.  
As a small island economy, Crimea was unable to afford its minimum subsistence levels without 
help from mainland metropoly, though that metropoly was not the richest one. In 2013 public 
sector wages consumed 4.6 billion hryvnas, most of Crimean budget revenues (Djatlikovich, 
2014), making region dependent on Ukraine in provision of social payments.  
Ukrainian strategy of development of Crimea till 2020 (Razumkov Centre, 2011) included 
considerable investments, which by the moment of Russian annexation totaled more than $1 
billion (by January 2014 exchange rate) with the government of the region being able to invest 
only a quarter of this sum (Djatlikovich, 2014). In 2013 70% of Crimea’s budget expenses were 
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paid from mainland (Butrin et al., 2014). Even Sevastopol, which is often thought to be the city 
over-dependent on the service of Russian navy and tourists, earned only 20% of what it needed 
to spend while the rest of Crimea had this indicator at 34% (Zanuda, 2014). It should be noted 
that economy of Sevastopol did not enjoy large direct benefits from the presence of Russian 
naval base. Russia did not pay for its use of naval base in Crimea directly (Lukinova, 2013) – 
though, it ought to pay $800 million to $1 billion annually for lease of Ukrainian territory: 
starting from 1993 Russia was using debt amortization schemes from energy industry, thus 
paying only $98 million a year (Ibid). «Intercompany eliminations» of this sort led to the 
situation when Sevastopol, in words of former Ukrainian minister of defense Anatoliy Hrytsenko  
«did not see the real money, which could be invested for Crimea» (Ibid). 
As Russia later, Ukrainian mainland tried to enhance Crimean economy with the use of 
development programs. In 1999-2004 free economic zones (FEZ) and territories of priority 
development (TOR) were created in 9 cities and districts of Crimea (Guchakova and Klimenko, 
2012 - 3). Ukrainian government and experts nurtured impressive plans of the development of 
Crimea (Baturin, 2006) – among which was the creation marine transport-industrial complex 
«Donuzlav» and creation of new resort, which together accounted for $17 billion. Ukrainian 
authorities have built fossils extraction industry on the peninsula – this is the reason why Crimea 
today is more or less self-sufficient in its gas supplies (Tjurin, 2014), quite unlike mainland 
Ukraine, which, by spring 2014, imported 165% of its domestic energy production (Eide and  
Rösler, 2014, p. 13). As a matter of fact, development of these resources in Black Sea region was 
the main part of Ukrainian ministry of energy’s strategy of developing energy independence of 
Ukraine from Russia (Boyko, 2012). However, in the end, all of that brought little success 
because Ukraine was unable to channel significant resources to the development of Crimea, the 
issue that becomes evident when economy of the peninsula is compared to the neighboring 
economy of Krasnodar Krai, which remained under Russian jurisdiction after 1991. 
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In our analysis of Crimea’s economy before and after 2014 the principal criteria of choice of 
analyzed sector was demonstrativeness – we needed to show the difference between «before» 
and «after». These are the following: 
1) Sectors with huge contribution to regional GRP and, biggest effect – agriculture and 
manufacturing; 
2) Sectors, that most vividly reflect the changes that took place after annexation– 
transportation, financial sector, construction and telecommunications; 
3) Sector, that is most representative in the sense of economic situation in the region – that 
would be tourism, because of the huge net effect it has on other sectors, including those 
mentioned above (+trade and others). 
 
The share of separate types of economic activity in the gross value added in the Crimea, %. 
Source: Guchakova and Klimenko – 2, 2012. 
2.1 Tourism and recreational complex. Tourism and recreational industry never were the only 
engines of economic development of the peninsula. In 2001-2011 period (Guchakova and 
Klimenko, 2012 - 4) share of enterprises from that sector made up just 6-8% of budget revenues. 
However, this sector will receive special attention, because of the huge net effect it has. 
Agriculture, food industry, construction are partially also largely dependent on the tourist flow. 
From the sectorial structure of GRP, it is difficult to assess the impact of tourism on the 
economy, because money spent by the tourists is distributed among various sectors of the 
economy, such as transportation, healthcare, agricultural production and trade. All together they 
account for more than 50% of Crimean GRP, so the developments in tourism industry might 
serve as a developmental factor for other industries and some form of indicator of overall 
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economic situation on the peninsula. It is also worth noting that tourism employs 21% of the 
workforce on the peninsula through permanent and seasonal jobs as many locals are renting out 
their property to the visitors (FNEB, 2015, p. 55). 
During 1990s the sector suffered huge contraction, from which it did not recover. If in 1988 the 
peninsula was visited by the record number of 8.3 million tourists (Jakovenko, 2011, p.144) – the 
closest number since then was 6 million people in reached in 2009 (Jakovenko, 2011, p.140). It 
was the biggest number since Ukraine became an independent state and is still not reached up to 
the date by Crimea in Russia. Yet, nominal increase did not generate significant revenue, which 
would boost local tourist economy. 
Due to the effects, caused by dissolution of USSR, tourists from Ukraine during 1990s have 
gradually replaced tourists from other former Soviet republics, of which the biggest group of 
contributors consisted of tourists from Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), 
which after 1991 transformed in Russian Federation. In 2009 Ukrainian tourists made up 74% of 
all tourists on the peninsula (Slepokurova, 2013), after some decrease by the end of 2013 they 
still made up from 66% (Ibid) down to 60% (Ratnikov and Volkova, 2014) of all tourists in 
Crimea – which in 2013 was about 5.9 million people (MKTRK, 2013, p.1). Russians made up 
significant part of the overall tourist flow that year – 26.1% (Ibid, p.3), but they were far from 
being majority. This change affected the tourist industry significantly – in the course of 20 years 
after Ukraine gained independence, the average length of tourist stay in the Crimea decreased 
from 20-24 to 10-14 days, which reduced the loading of the resorts and hotels (Titov and 
Kuvshinova, 2014) and the period of holiday season decreased from 3.5 months in 1991 to 2.5-3 
months in 2006-2009 period (Shevchuk, 2009, p.188). While increasing number of overall 
tourists, starting from the second half of 2000s, Crimea was losing the visitors with the highest 
paying capacity – only in the period of 2005-2009 the share of relatively rich tourists decreased 
from 50% of all visitors to 30% (Ibid). There is no precise data on the differences in 
expenditures of different nationalities in the last years of Crimea within Ukraine, but some 
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calculation could be made on the basis of tourist’s arrivals in 2012 and 2014: in the first nine 
months of 2012 number of tourists was almost 6 million people who have spent on the peninsula 
6 billion hryvnas (Markova, 2013), which at the currency rate of the time was something like 23 
billion rubles; in the same period of 2014, when the inflow of tourists, according to different 
estimates, was between 1.35 million people and 2.361 million people (Bologov, 2014), 60 billion 
rubles were spent in Crimea (Ibid) – due to the fact of annexing Russians made up that year 
majority of the visitors. Of course this sum should be adjusted to inflation – but even after this 
correction it demonstrates the fact that purchasing power of Russian tourists in relation to 
Crimean tourism remained higher than of their Ukrainian counterparts.  
This contraction had the long-lasting effects for the sector. Shortage of tourists was the reason 
why infrastructure in the region stagnated or degraded during 1990s. During Soviet period 
vacation in Crimea was largely subsidized in form of vouchers or by other means to make this 
type of vacation affordable to masses, which explains the proportions of representation of 
particular groups of population in tourist flow: 43% were from the ranks of the governmental 
office personnel and 36% were workers (Jakovenko, 2011, p. 144) – precisely the categories of 
population that were supposed to enjoy substantial benefits in socialist state. Collapse of the 
common state along with capitalist reforms have deprived these categories of population of their 
ability to afford vacation in Crimea, which partially explains the fall in number of visitors, 
discussed above, and explains why the filling rates of Crimean recreational centers in 1990’s 
was, on average, at 45% of their capacity (Nikolaenko, 1998, p.54-57). Domestic market was too 
small to create demand sufficient to keep this industry afloat, while turbulent economic and 
political situation in Ukraine and Russia could not guarantee flow of tourists from outside. These 
views were shared by governing authorities of the region: Ukrainian Prime Minister of Crimea 
Anatolii Mohyliov in his interview concluded that after 20 year since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, Crimea lost most of its potential in that sphere (Mohyliov, 2013). One of the most 
important consequences was the changing structure of Crimea as  tourism and recreation center: 
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due to the decrease in number of tourists, their low purchasing power and decrease in a number 
of vacation days peninsula ceased to be predominantly  all-the-year-round resort and became a 
seasonal resort, operating mostly during summer (Guchakova and Klimenko, 2012 - 4), which, in 
turn created a negative net effect, causing «similar seasonal processes in most sectors of the 
economy of the Crimea, in employment, in the fluctuations in level of the prices, the structure of 
incomes and consumer needs, in revenues of the budget, in the pressure on the social and 
engineering infrastructure» (Ibid). It also decreased competitive qualities of Crimea in the tourist 
sector, because beach season in the closest rival tourist economies like Turkey was much longer 
– from 6 to 7.5 months (Ibid). 
By 2011 Crimean tourist infrastructure became inferior to almost all of its regional rivals, failing 
even to reconstruct the existing facilities, not speaking of massively opening new ones 
(Guchakova and Klimenko, 2012 – 5). That year from all 20 Crimean hotels, which were 
undergoing international certification, none has received 5-star rating (Ibid). Degradation of 
professional licensed vacation enterprises has created conditions for large shadowy economy, 
which made it difficult to get the budget revenues from the tourist sector and to count true 
number of tourist visitors. 
In 2013 (Ministerstvo kurortov i turizma Respubliki Krym, 2013, p.1) only 20% of 6 million 
tourists were «organized tourists» (i.e. those, who went to hotels or other licensed recreation 
centers), the rest were visitors, who have chosen private accommodation. The problem was that 
this sector was not accountable to Ukrainian executive authorities, hence creating large 
opportunities for tax evasion. Now and then – net effect of the tourism contributed to shadow 
economy in the peninsula. For example, in 2008 99.8% of 8368 checked private enterprises, 
operating in food industry, gambling, fuel, alcohol and tobacco industries did not register their 
income, thus, hiding taxes (Regnum, 2008). In 2013 alone regional budget did not receive 2 
billion hryvnas because of smuggling (Leshhenko, 2013) – more than 40% of budget revenues in 
2013 (ZN.UA, 2014). This is the common problem of tourist regions around the world – for 
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example, in New Orleans online property renting platforms such as Airbnb attract many tourists 
to the non-taxable households, thus decreasing budget revenues from tourist industry (Walker, 
2016). 
2.2 Construction and real estate. In 2014 construction made 2.8% of Crimea’s GRP and 
employed 3.7% of economically active population in the republic (MERRK, 2015, p. 55). 
Revival of tourist inflow in the end of 1990’s made construction business for the purpose of 
tourism an attractive investment opportunity, yet at the cost of deteriorating ecological situation 
(Bokov et al., 1998). This sector, despite its relatively modest share in overall economic 
structure, was vulnerable to corruption and speculation. In 2008 Crimean GRP was about 27.4 
billion hryvnas – approximately $3.4 billion by 2008’s exchange rate. It did not correspond to 
the price of land, because it was worth of only 1-1.5 thousand hectares of earth, meaning $3-3.5 
million for hectare (Guchakova and Klimenko, 2012 - 3). Profitability of luxury real estate 
construction far exceeded any other sector – 500% before 2008 (Ibid). Later, after annexation in 
2014 real estate and land will be one of the fastest growing industries on the peninsula and one 
of the reasons for the intensification of the ethnic conflict between Russian population and 
repatriating Crimean Tatars.  
2.3 Manufacturing. In the late Soviet times manufacturing made up almost 20% of Crimean 
economy, but even as economy shrunk in the aftermath of dissolution of USSR,  the sector made 
more than 10% of economic output – something like 13.9% of regional GDP in 2014 (MERRK, 
2015, p. 9). Shares of different segments is evenly distributed in the following way: production 
of food, drinks and tobacco – 27.7%; chemical industry – 16.1%; extractive industry – 10%; 
machine-building – 11%; supplies of electricity, gas, steam and conditioned air – 26.9% (Ibid, p. 
11). At the moment of annexation, 9% of economically active population is employed in this 
sector (Kondratiev and Agibalov, 2014, p. 15). 
Most of the enterprises have suffered from the downturn in 1990s that affected both Russia and 
Ukraine. This is not a unique story – most of Eastern European industrial enterprises have found 
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themselves in the same situation in 1990s as their hosting countries were unable to secure 
investments they needed (Berend, 1996, p.18) and were forced to sell valuable assets for low 
price to foreigners and closing down those, which were unable to compete with the production of 
much more developed foreign enterprises (Swain, 2011, pp. 1672-1677). The difference was that 
Crimea did not find any sources for recovery and subsequent growth. 
Unlike in other transition economies, which after a period of economic and political turbulence 
in 1990s managed to achieve sustainable growth, economic restructuring in Crimea did not 
create the sustainable economy. «Labor force, dismissed from these industries, was absorbed 
mostly by small businesses, which in the Crimea was not to the great extend a classic type of 
entrepreneurship able to develop a middle class, but was the means of survival and self-
employment of population» (Guchakova and Klimenko, 2012 - 2).   
Light industry became virtually non-existent – and the rest was stagnating. For example, 
chemical industry increased its share in the peninsular economy significantly – but the output 
remained the same as in 1980s (Guchakova and Klimenko, 2012 - 3). Chemical industry in 
Ukraine overall was hit by 2008 economic crisis (Dymov, 2010), but big role in its decline and 
stagnation was played by ageing of equipment and technological lagging. In Crimea this industry 
remained afloat mostly thanks to the benefits of North-Crimean Special Economic Zone, which 
allowed the respective enterprises to meet their requirements in investment capital by returning 
some of the taxes (Guchakova and Klimenko, 2012 - 3). Another positive factor was that demand 
of mainland Ukraine for products like sulphuric acid did not decrease dramatically as surge in 
mining industry and metallurgy (where these materials are needed) on the mainland kept demand 
stable. Another factor was that the biggest enterprises in this sub-sector had natural monopoly in 
the production of certain chemical materials: «Krymsky Titan» is the largest manufacturer of 
titanium dioxide in Eastern Europe, «Krymskij sodovyj zavod» is the only Ukrainian 
manufactures of technical soda ash, «Brom» factory is the biggest enterprise on post-Soviet 
space, which specializes on production of bromine and bromide compounds.  
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2.4 Agriculture. Crimea used to be one of the food industry centers in the Soviet Union, with 
specialization on the refinery of fish, fruits, vegetables and grapes (Guchakova and Klimenko, 
2012). By 2013 food industry had a bigger share in the structure of regional economy than any 
other branch – even more than chemical manufacturing (Titov, 2014, pp. 8-13). At the same time 
production output did not increase – on the contrary, it fell as market and demand shrunk with 
the end of Soviet Union (FNEB, 2015, p. 11) and Crimean food industry became reoriented 
primarily towards internal market. All industries suffered major decline not only in 1990s, but 
also through the better part of 2000s (Guchakova and Klimenko, 2012 - 2) when economy of the 
mainland stabilized and enjoyed growth. Fivefold reduction of the area of the Crimean gardens 
and twofold reduction of vineyards (Ibid) reflected falling demand and the development of food 
and wine industries in the mainland Ukraine and elsewhere.  Most of agriculture started to shift 
to private households – and not because they were more competitive, it was just another mean of 
survival for population (Ibid). However, decline in agriculture and food industry was not dictated 
by negative situation in Ukraine, but rather by lack of delay of privatization (Mironova and 
Shandra, 2002), that has prevented Crimean agricultural complex from adapting to the changing 
capitalist environment at the time when agricultural complex in the mainland went through these 
changes and was able to show positive growth by 2000s (Ibid). Decline was evident in all 
spheres of Crimean agriculture (MERRK, 2015, pp. 32-37), from the size of the acreage to the 
value of harvest. 
2.5 Transportation. The region has relatively developed infrastructure (MERRK, 2015, p. 47): 
14582.26 km of roads; 4 commercial sea ports (Kerch, Feodosia, Yalta, Yevpatoria); 2 ferry 
crossings; 2 civil airports (in the cities of Simferopol and Kerch); the developed network of 
railway lines with the length of 645.3 km. But even with this advantage, transportation rates in 
the region fell dramatically after the collapse of USSR – from 1990 to 2009 tonnage turnover 
decreased 2.5 times (Guchakova and Klimenko, 2012 - 3), reflecting shrinking importance of 
Crimea as the transportation hub on the post-Soviet space, which was inevitable, because Odessa 
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suited transportation needs of Ukraine more and Russia was developing Novorossiysk at the 
time. In such surrounding, when Crimea ceased to be local hub of the bigger country, its 
transportation sector started to shrink along with many other sectors of economy.  
2.6 Banking and finances. By February 2014 Crimea had around 180 banks with 1000 local 
branches with deposits of population up to 20 billion hryvnas (Krasnova and Verzhbickij, 2014). 
But in terms of lending activity Crimea was one of the least active regions, as overall economic 
situation in the region did not  provide any incentives to sector for active expansion – lending to 
private households and businesses remained low as regional economy was shrinking or 
stagnating (Ovchinnikova and Ovchinnikova, 2015, p. 2). Almost 80% of all banking operations 
on the peninsula were carried out by 17 banks (Ovchinnikova, 2015, p. 21) and 30% of all 
deposits were stored in «Privat Bank» (Ibid). Within financial framework of bigger Ukraine 
Crimea did not have significant share: by February 1
st
 2014 collective debt of 350 thousand 
Crimean citizens was estimated as 16.6 billion hryvnas (Bocharova, 2015) – fracture of overall 
credit portfolio of Ukrainian banks, which soon reached almost 1 trillion hryvnas (Ormocadze, 
2014). Nevertheless, the financial sector was working at its full capacity, had large number of 
banks represented and all international payment systems were functioning.  
Moreover, financial sector in the region, at least in number of banks, was more or less at the 
development of more economically successful regions of Russia and Ukraine. It could be 
considered as one of the few sectors that went through positive change after 1990s. However, the 
latter could be attributed to the fact of transitional change from planned economy to market, 
when emergence of private financial institutions became inevitable. 
2.7 Telecommunications. In the years preceding annexation this sector had high rates of 
development – for example, in 2013, which was depressive for Ukrainian economy, the regional 
growth in this area was more than 15% and the overall size of the market was estimated to be 
worth $0,4 billion (CP, 2015 – 2, p. 25). 73% of revenues came from mobile communications, 
11% from broadband wired Internet access, 8% for paid TV, 7% for fixed telephony and 1% for 
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broadband wireless access (Ibid., p. 26). Most of the mobile telephony was 2G, 3G was 
relatively rare.  The penetration rate of mobile communication was lower than in Russia, 130% 
against 200% (Ibid.). 
Mobile communications market was divided between 3 different companies: 57% – MTS 
Ukraine (MTS, Russia), 21% - Kyevstar (VimpelCom Ltd, Netherlands), 16% - Life (55% 
belonging to Turkcell, Turkey; 45% to the group of companies under control of Ukrainian 
oligarch Rinat Akhmetov). Telephone density was about 59% for Crimea and 72% for 
Sevastopol – and over 72% of phones were serviced by Ukrainian company «Ukrtelecom» 
(Ibid.). 
Overall, the sector was relatively well developed and though its state was far from the most 
advanced regions in Russia and Ukraine, it was corresponding to the overall development level 
of the region. 
Summary. In the period from 1991 to 2013 Crimean economy largely shrank or stagnated in all 
sectors, except for banking, telecommunications and construction. Growth in first two was due to 
the fact that they were absent before the transition to market economy took place, the growth in 
construction owed to speculative factors. 
The comparison with the neighboring Russian region would help to understand that different 
trajectory of development was not impossible. 
Krasnodar Krai: different parallel development 
Russian region of Kuban is different from Crimea in aspect of size and number of residents – its 
territory and population are roughly 3 times bigger than Crimea. At the same time, both regions 
share similarities, which make their comparison relevant and justified from scientific point of 
view:  the density of population, sectorial proportions of agriculture and tourism, climate, 
territorial specialization and even  urbanization rate –in Krasnodar Krai it is about 53% (Russian 
Federal State Statistics Service, 2015), slightly lower than Crimea’s 58% (Ibid).  
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Unlike its neighbor, Krasnodar started to develop as a resort area rather late. Booming 
development of Crimea and environmental difficulties related to nature of Kuban region (Sochi 
had to undergo through terra-forming and reconstruction because it was a wetland, infested with 
malarial mosquitoes) made Sochi less attractive. Development of Sochi started just in 1930s 
(Conterio, 2015; 2016), when Crimea already was well-known resort with large centers of 
industry. During Soviet years Sochi emerged as the regional recreational center as well as 
agricultural hub, but yet it was second to Crimea and in the best years serviced up to 4 million 
people a year (Lappo, 2008). Just like Crimea in 1990s, Krasnodar Krai suffered from financial 
troubles and sharp decline in a number of visitors (Ibid). But unlike Crimea, even in the worst 
years the region was still able to attract investments in its infrastructure, which included number 
of five-star hotels, additional branches of the road and the train station (Ibid).  
Krasnodar Krai is also an example of importance of the qualified governance for the successful 
economic development. In 2001 Alexander Tkachev became governor of the region and 
undertook number of measures, which included organization of investment forums and setting up 
the program «Resorts of Krasnodar Krai», thanks to which number of tourists increased from 5 
million people in 2002 to 12 million people in 2009 (MK, 2014). In the meantime other sectors 
increased their output and productivity thanks to the similar stimulating policies. In the structure 
of GRP of the region the share of each of the five main sectors – agriculture, industry, transport, 
trade and construction – ranges from 10% to 20% (ITE, 2013, p. 2). Overall, Krasnodar Krai 
presents rare success story of the Russian regional development programs, which usually fail to 
deliver significant development, limiting down to keeping the chosen region on the optimum 
minimum subsistence wage. Natural results, as well as favorable conditions of being part of the 
big Russian economy (like having large domestic market and enough land and population), 
played the most important role, but regional economy received additional boost by Kremlin’s 
politicized sports event. 
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In 2013 Krasnodar, prior to Olympic Games in Sochi, 11.6 million tourists have visited the 
resorts of region (Solovieva, 2014). But massive projects like Olympic Games helped to increase 
number of tourists in 2014 to 12.3 million people (RIA Novosti, 2015). The very fact of Russia 
being rich enough to host Olympics allowed Krasnodar Krai to benefit from these investments – 
private investments made up only 4% of $45 billion of overall investments in Olympics (FBK, 
2014, p.7), while the rest was done through state-owned companies. This investment looks even 
more impressive on the background of Sochi being relatively marginal region inside Russia 
(A.O., 2014), where such massive investments simply could not pay off – at least not as quick as 
they did in Beijing, where 75% of all Olympic investments were made for long-term 
infrastructure projects in the city of 20 million people (Lu, 2014). And yet, despite controversies 
surrounding Olympic Games that were a big achievement for the Russian Black Sea region, 
where «potential capacity for holiday accommodation» in 2009 was estimated at the level of 
only 600 thousand people per year (Shevchuk, 2009, p.188). 
Like in Crimea, share of food industry increased in the economy of region, but unlike Crimea it 
did not lock itself in internal market, but became top exporter of food in other regions (PWC, 
2013, p. 18). From 2002 to 2012 GRP of Krasnodar Krai doubled in real terms (Bljahman, 2014, 
p. 10) and region was among leaders in Russian rankings of the development of transport, 
engineering and social infrastructure (Ibid, p. 17).  
In 2000s region has achieved high manufacturing growth index (Sugaipova and Zelepuhina, 
2014, p. 165) – output increased 4.5 times in the first decade of the century. It is worth noting 
that in the process, brand new large plants were introduced (like German-Russian manufacturing 
plant CLAAS or heavy engineering plant in Armavir), while in Crimea no big new 
manufacturing plants were opened – the youngest enterprise is «Camozzi-pneumatic-
Simferopol», which was opened in 1991, while Mikhail Gorbachev was the president of still 
united USSR.  
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In 2013 GRP per capita in Krasnodar Krai was 300 thousand rubles (State Statistics Committee 
of the Ukraine, 2013), while in Crimea it was about 93 thousand rubles (State Statistics 
Committee of the Ukraine, 2016). Why the two similar regions were developing different way? 
The differences between Ukrainian Crimea and Russian Krasnodar will be explained in the 
following part of dissertation. 
Crimea and Krasnodar: explaining the difference 
There are 3 aspects, which dictated lags in Crimean economy – first was economic, second 
related to the institutional developments in mainland Ukraine and the third will be political 
economy of market transition in Crimea itself.  
First of all, the size and state of the economy. Russia had a bigger population, more natural 
resources and bigger share in global trade – that is why Krasnodar Krai, which was lagging in its 
development in comparison to Crimean in the beginning of 1990s, succeeded at replacing 
Crimea on the Russian market. Ukraine was simply incapable of providing Crimea with the same 
incentives and investments as Kremlin and Krasnodar leadership were able to. According to 
World Economic Forum experts, which comprised Global Competitiveness Index (Schwab and  
Sala-i-Martín, 2013), Russia scored much higher than Ukraine in terms of macroeconomic 
stability, quality of infrastructure, size of internal market and innovative potential. In some 
positions like professional training or the size of financial market Ukraine has surpassed Russia, 
but the gap in these categories is not really big and in rating summary Russia has position 64, 
while Ukraine has position 84 (Ibid). The fact that in 2013 GDP per capita in Russia was 
$14818, big enough when compared to Ukraine’s $3919 (data drawn from IMF, 2014) explains 
why neither Ukrainian tourists, nor Ukrainian government had any funds to modernize Crimean 
economy and integrate it more with the Ukrainian mainland – instead, prior to Maidan almost 
half of Ukrainian working migrants were working in Russia (Neprjahina, 2013). Ukraine was 
and remains country, which is significantly poorer than Russia. In Credit Suisse’s 2013 report 
Ukraine was noted among the poorest countries in Europe (Keating et al, 2013, p. 8). Economic 
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troubles in mainland Ukraine were immediately reflected on the peninsula in 2013: back then 
stagnation and looming recession in the Ukrainian mainland were evident (Panchenko, 2014) and 
rating agency «Standard & Poor» decreased rating of the region to the national level (UNIAN, 
2013) – a worrying trend, given that Crimea did not enjoy the same gains of economic growth in 
the better period of 2000s.  
Second explanation might be less obvious, but it could have played its role – the quality of 
institutions. That factor is argued by some scholars (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2013) to be of 
crucial importance for the economic prosperity. That might be part of explanation since there has 
to be the reason why Ukraine have started in 1991 with better economic situation than Poland 
and finishing in 2012 with real GDP lower than in the beginning and a third of what Polish 
economy could show (Hanke, 2014). In 2012 experts from PricewaterhouseCooper and World 
Bank (PWC and World Bank, 2012) have rated Ukrainian tax system as one of the worst in the 
world with only Congo and Venezuela behind. In the Global Competitiveness Index, cited 
earlier, Russia scored higher than Ukraine in terms of quality of the institutions (Schwab and 
Sala-i-Martín, 2013) – it has place 121, Ukraine is on the 137
th
 place. Of course, this difference 
is not sufficient enough to explain why Krasnodar developed and Crimea stagnated, but this 
notion is worth consideration. Initial economic starting point was good – 6
th
 largest consumer 
market in Europe, young and qualified workforce, access to growing markets of Middle East 
through Black Sea ports and the availability of cheap Russian gas (Eide and Rösler, 2014, p. 5). 
But «those in power focused on dividing the pie of the Ukrainian economy rather than growing 
it» (Ibid), which have cause stagnation and economic crisis in Ukraine which made Crimean 
population reluctant about joining with the rest of the mainland. In the research covering positive 
influence of Habsburg-era institutions on the development of the territories in modern states in 
Eastern Europe, which once belonged to Austro-Hungary (Becker and Woessmann, 2011) 
Ukrainian regions with Habsburg past (like Lemberg-Lviv) have much worse results than their 
counterparts in Poland. Corruption cannot be fully blamed for the economic underdevelopment, 
43 
 
as there are different types of it, some of which could not hurt economic performance 
(Wedeman, 1997) – an example of such approach could be Syngman Rhee’s South Korea (Ibid, 
pp. 465-469), where government supported business groups, willing to finance them and in the 
course of 3 decades economy increased 6 times. However, by Ukrainian standards of 
governance, institutions in Crimea were considered to be very good: in 2013 rating of 
effectiveness of governors, region as the whole (Sevastopol + Crimea) was second only to Kiev 
(Regnum, 2013). These results are partly the reason why quality of institutions is not the most 
important criteria – the worst results in this rating were shown by a couple of far western regions 
of the country (Ibid), which later did not show any inclination for secession. Yet, even in 2008, 
according to Ukrainian polls overwhelming majority of Crimean residents were in favor of 
secession from Ukraine and joining Russia, while maintaining huge resentment towards 
governmental and legislative institutions existing in mainland Ukraine (Ibid) – it is possible that 
the mentioned resentment existed also due to the part that corruption in the country may have 
altered economic development of Crimea as it did hurt economic development of the mainland 
Ukraine. This is not to say that Russia had less problems with corruption, but its abundance of 
resources and much bigger size of economy in comparison to Ukraine allowed Kremlin to build 
«rent-scraping» type of economy, example of which was provided by Philippines during rule of 
Ferdinand Marcos: elite group and people affiliated with it benefit from the exploitation of 
economy in the ways that benefit them personally, while overall economy continues to grow 
despite their otherwise hurtful actions, because of its size and potential (Wedeman, 1997, pp. 
469-473). While suffering from the same problems as its bigger neighbor, Ukrainian economy 
was just not big enough to provide Crimea with incentives for the healthy growth. 
Third explanation is that privatization in Crimea took place much later than in Krasnodar Krai 
and the rest of Ukraine – in the beginning of 2000s (Mironova and Shandra, 2002), when both 
Russia and Ukraine have established functioning free market. There are strong arguments against 
policy of shock therapy (Murrell, 1993), however, during 1990s Crimean economy continued to 
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work the same way, as it did in USSR, without any restructuring at all. Despite political gains 
(peninsula did not suffer social upheaval, which often comes with privatization), in economic 
terms this strategy just delayed the inevitable and increased the negative impact. Other regions of 
Ukrainian south (Kherson, Cherkasy, Nikolaev, Odessa) went through privatization already in 
1990’s and by the beginning of the new century there were functioning capitalist enterprises. 
Particularly in Crimean agriculture fall owed mostly to the rise of large and effective enterprises 
on the Ukrainian mainland. Presence of government of autonomous republic in local economy 
was always big and in 2004 it even temporarily took direct control over prices for gasoline, 
diesel fuel and some types of food products (Vesti, 2004). It is worth noting that in period of 
1996 to 2010 share of Crimea in Ukraine’s FDI statistics was decreasing (Guchakova and 
Klimenko, 2012 - 3). Announcement of Chinese investors planning to build deep-water port in 
Crimea and invest about $10 billion in the peninsula (Hornby, 2013) seemed to counter negative 
trend, but these plans, first, were aiming for long-term perspective, and, second, failed to 
materialize altogether because 3 months later Russia have annexed peninsula and the lack of 
international recognition made perspectives of making business in region risky because of 
sanctions. But another signed deal of the period, agreement to lease some of Ukrainian arable 
land to Chinese holding to grow food for Chinese consumers, which was worth $2.6 billion, 
included the region of Dnepropetrovsk (Zuo, 2013), but not Crimea – an indirect confirmation of 
relatively low attractiveness of region’s agricultural sector in comparison to the regions in the 
mainland, which developed during 1990’s privatization.  
Summary. We can make the following conclusions, which are important for studying of 
Crimean economy after 2014: 
1) After 1991 Crimean economy shrunk and suffered decline in comparison to its neighbors 
in mainland Ukraine and Russia; 
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2) The reasons for economic decline were primarily geo-economical: Ukraine was unable to 
offer Crimea the same economic opportunities which Russia could have offered to 
Krasnodar Krai; 
3) Crimea retained the most important features of small island economies, most importantly 
– dependency on mainland, though the mainland have changed from Russia/RSFSR to 
Ukraine; 
4) Economic development of Crimea is dependent on ability of mainland to invest in its 
development as the region is not self-sufficient in that sense; 
5) By the moment of annexation Crimea was underdeveloped in comparison to its Russian 
neighbors – hence further integration and development had to take the form of regional 
development programme.  
Our findings in this chapter are consistent with parts of our theoretical framework in the 
following areas: 
 Small island economies: Briguglio and McElroy have pointed out that such economies 
are dependent on the mainland in economic sense (for investment, supplies etc.) even if 
they are not politically subordinate to this mainland. Other researches from the similar 
economies by other researchers confirmed it. Crimea has primary features of such 
economies – first by being dependent on the demand and investments from USSR, then 
from Ukraine. Worsening of situation on the mainland was reflected in Crimean economy 
– just like it happens with economies of this kind; 
 Institutions: Acemoglu’s works written in cooperation with Johnson (2005) and Robinson 
(2013) are stressing the importance of the institutional quality for the successful 
economic development; evidences gathered by different researchers in different regions 
(Iyer, 2010; Becker and Woessmann, 2011; Lee and Schultz, 2012) add to that notion that 
institutions may vary both within one country consisting of regions with diverse 
historical backgrounds or, on the contrary, be similar between different countries with the 
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shared historical past. It is relevant in our case, where Crimea was the part of one 
common country, then became the part of a smaller country with the worse economic 
indicators and lower quality of institutions. Another point is that we have examined 
negative effect of the delayed privatization on the Crimean enterprises – which supports 
the notion that privatization has generally positive effect on the performance of the 
enterprises; 
 Economic integration: evidences we have gathered from the case of integration of former 
GDR allow to see and examine two neighboring comparable regions, that have different 
levels of economic development – in our case example of more developed territory was 
Krasnodar Krai, which have shown benefits of developing inside Russia (earlier and 
successful privatization; better institutions; the access to bigger Russian market). 
Analysis of later economic development of Crimea in Chapter 3 will be based on these 
conclusions, as well as on the findings in the theoretical framework, which were provided earlier. 
Chapter 3: Changes in Crimean economy after March 2014 
3. Economic status of Crimea after March 2014. After the first year of annexation Russian 
administration have concluded the first stage of integrating Crimean in Russian political and 
economic system by taking the following steps (CP (2015 – 2, pp. 13-15): organizing elections 
and establishing governing authorities on the basis of Russian legal framework; creating 
development programs and development clusters for all sectors of economy; applying Federal 
Special Purpose Program «The Social and Economic Development of the Republic of Crimea 
and the city of Sevastopol till 2020» worth hundreds of billions of rubles; handing out Russian 
passports to population and reregistering the enterprises and other legal entities; recertification of 
military personnel, public officials and lawyers; implementing Russian legal framework; 
assigning donor regions from the ranks of successful Russian mainland regions to assist the new 
Crimean regions (for example, Moscow was chief donator to Sevastopol); creating SEZ on the 
territory of Sevastopol; introducing Russian ruble as the main currency.  
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It is important to mention that Russian central authority did not change governing structure of the 
region, by giving to the already present Crimean public officials and judiciary preferential right 
to join the ranks after annexation (FKZ №6, 2014). It means that despite the change in the upper 
governing authority to the Moscow-appointed governor, the rest of the governance remained the 
same because the people remained the same.  
Ukraine also has taken steps in relation to the economic positioning of the region. Apart from not 
recognizing the new status of Crimea with all the ensuing consequences such as blockade and 
blackouts, the government in Kiev applied certain legislative measures: regulatory ban on the 
banking activity in the annexed territory (NBU №260, 2014) and the law recognizing Crimeans 
as banking non-residents (NBU №699, 2014); recognition of Crimea as free economic zone 
(Law №163, Verkhovnaya Rada, 2014), which also acknowledges its territorial status de-facto, 
though not de-jure. The external factors inflicted on Crimean economy were handled by the mix 
of state authorities and non-governmental actors with the expressed interest in return of the 
peninsula to the Ukrainian jurisdiction. For example, railway communication with Crimea was 
halted by Kiev government in the end of 2014, but the transport blockade which started in 
September 2015 and aimed to curb active trade between Crimea and Ukraine, was not the work 
of Ukrainian governmental authorities, but of the NGO «The Mejlis of Crimean Tatar People» 
and their supporters. Power outages  were practiced by Ukrainian government since 2014 
because the war in Donbass increased pressure on the Ukrainian energy supply system and left 
no spare capacity to supply the annexed Crimea (CP, 2015 – 2, p. 37) – yet blackouts became 
much worse during «civil blockade», when non-state militants have bombed supply lines to the 
peninsula (Luhn, 2015), which has accounted for more than 2/3 of peninsula’s energy supply, 
thus hurting economic activity in the region for the period of insufficient energy supply. Such 
combination of unfavorable legislation in the mainland Ukraine and the additional pressure 
resulting from the disputes around peninsula and on it (such as Crimean Tatar community issue) 
have caused serious implications for Crimean economy. 
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International sanctions have also played their role on two levels. First, they affected most of the 
sectors, from banking industry to transportation by putting caps on the business activity that 
depends on foreign economic relationships of the peninsula – trade and FDI. By the moment of 
annexation Crimea had $191 million in FDI – later most of the investors pulled out (Urkosta, 
2015). Bypassing the sanctions proved to be possible, nevertheless sanctions had some success 
as they have increased transaction costs for those, participating in economic life of the peninsula. 
Second, they have scared off major Russian companies from participating directly in the region’s 
economic development – the most clearly it is evident in banking and telecommunications. Even 
when investors come they tend to cover their presence through the use of fake shell companies or 
the simple non-disclosure of the investor’s personality – the latter policy was applied in case of 
the future gambling zone on peninsula (Construction.Ru, 2016). That was the factor that 
continues to hamper economic integration of Crimea with Russia and its convergence with other 
Russian regions. 
Factors, determining economic development of Crimea could be divided in two groups – 
transitional and inherited. Those, in their own turn, could be positive and negative.  
Positive transitional factors are the following:  
 Investment programs offered by Russian government: Federal Targeted Programme for 
Crimea and Sevastopol’s Socioeconomic Development through to 2020, with financing 
totaling 708 billion rubles (JRL, 2016);  
 Direct and indirect incentives and benefits, granted by federal center: most importantly 
Special Economic Zone, which was established for 25 years. Other incentives include 
indirect subsidies, such as refund of some cost of the ticket to the inhabitants of the 
mainland Russia, who choose to travel to Crimea; 
 Closer integration with Russian market, which is bigger than Ukrainian one;  
 Expected increase of demand from the military: Russia expands its military presence on 
the peninsula, creating armed forces group adequate to its status of one of the Russian 
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regions (Bogdanov, 2016). Possibility of spillover effect for the civil sectors of the 
economy is obvious, but it could also be that like in Soviet times presence of the military 
will spark demand for sophisticated products of military purpose from local producers. 
Negative transitional factors would be:  
 Questionable legal status of Crimea, affecting the economy directly (e.g. through 
sanctions and blockade) and indirectly (e.g. by creating uncertainty about property 
rights). Wide nationalization that took place in Crimea after annexation created 
problems with ownership rights. Ukraine has lost 27 enterprises that owned 42 
thousand property units combined (Kulikov and Solomko, 2016) - 16 of them were 
listed for privatization. One of them, sanatorium «Foros», which earlier belonged to 
Ukrainian oligarch Igor Kolomoisky, was sold to the Federation of trade unions of the 
Republic of Tatarstan for 1,429 billion rubles (Ukrainian News, 2016), creating 
grounds for future legal disputes; 
 Painful separation from Ukraine, while still being dependent in the supply of 
electricity and water from there;  
 Ensuing closure of Ukrainian market (though not totally full);  
 Transition to some of the Russian norms (e.g. in banking sphere) had a negative 
effect, because regulative pressure increased; 
 Lack of the proper land connection to the mainland Russia. It is one of the major 
obstacles for successful integration and development of the region – it is expected 
that the bridge through Kerch Strait, worth 228.3 billion rubles, will be finished by 
the end of 2018 – and only since then the real growth could take place. The lags in 
connecting Crimea to Russia cause Russian government to postpone major 
investments on the peninsula (Sputnik, 2015; Moscow Times, 2015 – 2) because 
investing in roads and railway network does not make sense until the completion of 
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Kerch Strait Bridge, which will carry passengers and cargo from the mainland Russia 
to the peninsula. 
Positive inherited factors: 
 Diversified and relatively developed economy with huge potential in manufacturing, 
agriculture and tourism. As we have seen from the chapter 2, Crimea used to be an 
important economic hub in Soviet times. 
Negative inherited factors:  
 Major under-development in comparison to the regions in the mainland Russia and the 
ensuing need to ensure catching up of the peninsula with the national standards;  
 Lack of proper connectedness with Russia (land connection by the bridge through Kerch 
is expected to start no earlier than in 2018) and disrupted connectivity to Ukraine 
increases the negative effects of the main feature of small island economy – dependency 
on the mainland (i.e. the expected benefits of the economic integration with bigger and 
richer Russia did not materialize to the scale that was expected because of natural 
infrastructural limitations);  
 Problems with supplying energy. In energy supply structure Crimea is over-dependent on 
Ukraine (MERRK, 2015, p. 28) – Ukraine accounts for 70-90% of its energy supplies. 
Still after all hostilities, Russian government continues to pay for electricity supplies 
from the mainland Ukraine to Crimea – 13.2 billion rubles in 2016 alone, 800 million 
rubles more than a year before (Minenergo №1427, 2015). The way to secure Crimean 
energy independence by connecting it to Russian mainland energy system, is estimated to 
be about 47.3 billion rubles (Moscow Times, 2015 – 2) and it will take years to complete 
– no earlier than by the end of 2020 (Ibid.). Most of the water supplies also come from 
Ukrainian mainland – 86.7% before 2014 (MERRK, 2015, p. 57). In that respect sides 
did not come to mutual agreement and the water supply decreased dramatically, affecting 
dependent sectors such as agriculture;  
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 High criminality and corruption, as well as large share of informal economy, superseding 
even the Russian levels, did not disappear and continued to affect the economic 
development;  
 Presence of non-complimentary Crimean Tatar minority serves as catalyst for disruptions 
(e.g. blackouts and trade blockade). 
Findings from our theoretical framework are corresponding with these arguments and would be 
used in the process.  
3.1 Macroeconomic governance. As was said earlier, Russia applies towards Crimea 
reconstruction policies and integration policies slightly similar to what FRG has applied towards 
territories of the former Eastern Germany – generous subsidization and financing in order to 
narrow the gap between the most developed and underdeveloped regions. The previously 
mentioned sum of 708 billion rubles intended for the development of Crimea does not include 
additional benefits and incentives, such as governmental subsidizing for the travels from the 
Russian mainland to the peninsula. Crimea’s features of small-island economy bring additional 
weight on the mainland, as Crimean economy cannot be sustained without the significant help 
from Russia. Kremlin’s task, however, is also complicated by the international status of Crimea, 
which brings such constraining factors as sanctions, disruptions in supplies, lack of clarity in 
property rights and many other related problems pointed out in the theoretical framework. 
Today Crimea is even more dependent on transfers from the mainland budget, while being 
internationally unrecognized part of Russia, than when it was part of Ukraine: around 80% of its 
budget consists of federal transfers (Sulejmanov, 2015). Given that value added tax stayed in 
Crimea in 2014, with all direct and indirect subsidizing schemes Crimea had 85% of budget 
coming from federal transfers – being in the same league as Chechnya and Ingushetia, subsidy-
dependent southern regions of Russia (Ibid). Up to the moment Crimea remains one of the 
largest recipients of the federal subsidies (Volkova et al., 2016) 
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This is not the first time when Russia pours large sums of money in the unrecognized territorial 
entity: only from 2008-2013 Kremlin invested 34 billion rubles in South Ossetia and 19 billion in 
Abkhazia (Shkurenko, 2014) – both remain dependent on Russia as the main sponsor. South 
Ossetia budget depends on Russian transfers for 90%, Abkhazia is reliant for 40% (Ibid) and 
Kremlin is showing readiness to increase its financing of these break-away regions (Antonova 
and Himshiashvili, 2015). High level of dependency on the mainland was already typical trait of 
Crimean economy, but given the tense international situation fully independent economic 
development of the peninsula is highly unlikely – and that makes comparison with unrecognized 
republics of Southern Caucasus, as well as with other subsidy-dependent regions of Russia 
appropriate. External and constructional factors, accompanying economic development of 
disputed territories, as we will examine later, are slowing the economic progress. 
According to estimates of Ukrainian and Russian officials, as well as independent experts 
(Kondratiev and Agibalov, 2014, p. 7) in the period of 2013-2020 Crimean economy would need 
440 billion rubles of investments and subsidies – of which only slightly more than half would be 
investments, while the rest should be subsidies and social payments for population and socially 
sensible sectors such as electricity and water supply. The latter is understandable on the 
background of Crimean GRP per capita in 2013 (State Statistics Committee of the Ukraine, 
2016) being more than 3 times less than in neighboring Krasnodar Krai (State Statistics 
Committee of the Russian Federation, 2013) – 93 thousand rubles against 300 thousand rubles. 
As we will see later, Russian government had somewhat of a mixed success – the economy 
shrunk or stagnated in most of the sectors, but there was no total collapse due to the increased 
subsidization of population and optimum minimum level of provision of all vital services. 
The first transitional year (Nikolaev, 2015) had seen 1.7 increase in the size of the salaries – up 
to 21692 rubles and by the end of 2015 it reached 30200 rubles (Volkova et al., 2016). That 
increase was overshadowed by inflation. GDP, by some accounts (Nikolaev, 2015) fell by 11%.  
In the researched period inflation was 80%, but partially that was the result of increase in wages 
53 
 
to the Russian mainland level and subsequent growth of prices also owed to this factor (Volkova 
et al., 2016). 
Now we will see the changes that took place in the studied sectors after annexation.  
3.2 Tourism and recreational complex. The data regarding tourist flow differs after 2014. 
According to official estimations, the peninsula was visited by more than 3 million people in 
2014 (Lenta.Ru, 2015). Other estimations say that the inflow was about 4,1 million tourists 
(FNEB, 2015, p. 56) or 3.8 million people (MERRK, 2015, p. 43). The difficulty in estimating 
the true number lies in fact that was mentioned earlier – 80% of tourists settle in private sector 
(Ibid, p. 55) and the sector is barely accountable to the governing authorities, hence the true 
number of tourists is difficult to estimate as they often travel to the peninsula not as organized 
clients of recreational facilities, but as private visitors. It is still unclear how to count visitors, 
who came with tourist purposes, and separate them from people who have arrived to the 
peninsula for other needs. Yet it would be reasonable to say that the actual drop in number of 
tourists was no less than 2 million tourists, but no more than 3 million tourists – which would be 
rough equivalent of a number of Ukrainian tourists coming to peninsula every year before 2014. 
Such conclusions, due to the unavailability of the precise data, were drawn from the indirect 
signs, such as revenues from the tourism. Budget revenues from tourism, including the effects it 
had on other sectors, dropped by more than a third in 2014 – from 160 billion rubles year earlier 
to 103 billion rubles (FNEB, 2015, p. 56). Fall in a number of tourists was reflected in trade 
statistics, where turnover in retail decreased by 7.6% in 2014 (MERRK, 2015, p. 70). This data 
allows suggesting that there was a large drop in overall number of tourists, to a certain degree 
compensated by the growth in number of Russian tourists with their greater purchasing power. 
The factors influencing this sector are the following: 
1) Inherited: 
 Low quality of tourist infrastructure in comparison to other Russian regions such 
as Krasnodar Krai (Kondratiev  and Agibalov, 2014, p. 10). Existing strategy of 
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attracting up to 10 million tourists annually requires, at minimum, 90 billion 
dollars of investments (Ibid). At the moment of annexation, level of attrition of 
the recreational facilities was ranging from 70% to 90% (FNEB, 2015, p. 56; 
MERRK, 2015, p. 45); 
 Shadow economy – most of the tourists stay in the private households, thus 
complicating process of tax collection and statistical accounting. 
2) External/transitional: 
 Sharp drop in a number of tourists from Ukraine due to annexation; 
 Emerged infrastructural problems. Most of the tourist flow had to switch to the 
other means of arrival to Crimea, as the land border with Ukraine became much 
harder to access because of the political problems. Switch from the train 
transportation to the cars and airplanes had to make an impact in tourist 
accessibility. By official Russian accounts, the accent on these methods of 
transportation will allow to move to the peninsula no more than 4 million people 
(MERRK, 2015, p. 44); 
 Change from Ukrainian customers to Russian customers. In the first year alone 
demand for cheap vacation fell 2 times, while demand for «all inclusive» type of 
resort increased 4 times (Novosty Kryma, 2015). That confirms our earlier idea 
about greater purchasing power of Russian tourists in comparison to their 
Ukrainian counterparts. Expectations of Russian tourists were higher than what 
Crimea could have offered at the moment and that is partial explanation of why 
tourist inflows still haven’t reached peak Ukrainian levels. 
In 2015 Crimea was reported to have about 4.5 million tourists (Lenta.Ru, 2015 – 2; Deriabina, 
2016) – the overall number may be argued, but it correlates very well with the decrease in the 
number of Russians travelling abroad (Moscow Times, 2015) – their number fell almost by a 
third, from 14.5 million tourists in 2014 to 10 million tourists in 2015 (Kottasova, 2015). The 
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geopolitical concerns may have played their role, but the most likely reason for that was sharp 
depreciation of the Russian currency over 2014/2015 period, when it started as the result of 
structural problems in Russian economy and the effect multiplied by the falling oil prices and 
sanctions (Gorodiloff, 2015). Russian resorts and vacation sites had to benefit in certain ways 
from this fall as they became more affordable (Tihonov, 2015) – and that is logical that if Crimea 
became part of Russia de-facto and already has an established reputation in that sector, there was 
some increase in a number of tourists. Though the number of tourists from Ukraine decreased 
dramatically, they still contribute something to the overall number of visitors. Governmental 
incentives, promised by the first persons in the state (Wojazer, 2015) came into force later that 
year – the subsidized travel packages and other measures have made this tourist destination more 
attractive (Abrams, 2015; CP, 2015 – 2, pp. 40-41). Other measures such as billions of rubles in 
federal financing for renovation of tourist infrastructure (CP, 2015, p. 16) also were of help. 
All growth in the tourist sector after March 2014 is the recovery growth and it is unclear whether 
peninsula would be able to meet post-Soviet maximum of more than 6 million visitors. There are 
few obstacles: 
1) Lack of proper connectedness with the Russian mainland – in this respect, Krasnodar 
Krai is more attractive as it has much less problems with transportation. Traffic capacity 
of used transportation routes is reaching its limits and the controversial project of the 
bridge over Kerch is highly desirable in that sense; 
2) Average Russian tourist is used to much higher standards of vacation and the region has 
to catch up with it. It might be linked with the connectedness issue – inflow of Russian 
tourists would make vacation providers to adjust for their tastes.  
3.3 Construction and real estate. As it was observed in the part, related to the economic 
development of Crimea in years preceding annexation, this sector promised highest returns and 
profits, though due to speculative factors. Annexation brought no changes to this trend and, 
moreover, accelerated it: in the first year alone prices for real estate in the region rose 50% in 
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dollar terms (Pichuev, 2015 – 2) – the change even more spectacular, given the fact that during 
this period ruble has suffered major depreciation and if this fact will be taken into account, then 
the hike in prices would be about 150% (Ibid). The large part of the increase that year took place 
between March and June 2014 – confirming our preliminary conclusions that considerable share 
of growth on the peninsula happens on the promises of investments and reconstruction projects 
from the Russian mainland, reflecting its features of small island economy.  
Other drivers of growth were of the same nature – among them was increased demand for 
Crimean properties from the wealthy citizens of Russian mainland. The tourist property 
construction boom intensified even in the unfavorable economic circumstances of complicated 
transition period (FNEB, 2015, pp. 60-62), guaranteeing growth to this sector in the time of 
recession and stagnation in other industries. Another driver, though on much smaller scale, was 
the federal program of renovation of housing estates (Ibid., pp. 62-65). 
By February 2015 price per square meter have almost reached Moscow levels – 94 thousand 
rubles compared to 105 thousand rubles in capital (Dom. Lenta, 2015). Integration factors played 
their role as well – the lack of state registration of property rights (d'Amora, 2014; ROO, 2014, 
p.1) was causing lags in the development of the market, causing prices to increase on the 
speculative grounds, because most of the estate deals happened to be in dollars – so while deals 
were delayed in order to conduct them within Russian legal field, property prices increased along 
with the dollar price; other integration issue was that realty estate market in the region was 
formed with respect to Ukrainian pricing logic (Pichuev, 2014, p. 1-3), while simultaneous 
ascension to Russia resulted in rapid changes over the short period of time. In the issues of 
construction standards there were no transaction costs related to integration – seismic risk 
evaluation standards, for example, were the same in Ukraine and Russia, though both countries 
developed independently from each other for more than 20 years (Pichuev and Pichuev, 2014, 
pp. 1-4). Features of unrecognized territory had impact as well: new borders caused problems of 
logistical and transportation nature, inevitably increasing prices for the building materials – 
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supply route for new construction materials shifted from mainland Ukraine to Russian South 
which so far can be connected to Crimea only through ferry (Pichuev, 2015); entrenchment of 
the local economic elites was also evident – the list of biggest construction companies remained 
the same, all of them domestic (Pichuev, 2015 – 2) – no large companies from mainland Russian 
have intervened. Market of commercial property in Sevastopol has also increased, though at 
much slower rates (Pichuev and Pichuev, 2015).  
In the second year after annexation negative factors started to have an effect: by the end of 2015 
estate market prices contracted by 27% in dollar terms (REM Navigator, 2015). The most visible 
external factor is economic recession on the mainland Russia which resulted in GDP contraction 
around 3.7% (Zavyalova, 2015; FT, 2016; Luhn, 2016) – spillover of these problems to Crimea 
was inevitable because of its dependency on the mainland as the provider of investments and 
driver of demand growth. Status of unrecognized territory resulted in blackouts and civil trade 
blockade of peninsula from the Ukrainian mainland. This negative factor had to take effect, 
because pricing depends on the infrastructural issues (Malpezzi, 1999) – bulk of the demand 
concentrates in the segments of comfortable real estate equipped with all necessary facilities and 
infrastructure (Informer, 2016). These segments were the most vulnerable to disruptions caused 
by external influence. Positive development factors were almost absent on the market – the 
growth in the previous year was based upon expectations which had grounds in announcements 
of generous investment, but none of them was realized so far and no development 
announcements of the same scale were made that year. Another negative moment related to the 
legal stature of the region, was the lack of major banks – while Ukrainian banks withdrew from 
peninsula, no major Russian mortgage market players have entered Crimea, hence depriving real 
estate market of the growth incentives. Influence of sanctions appears to be limited – as principal 
«Crimean» sanctions were enacted in 2014 when the explosive growth has happened and this 
factor could have only indirect effect – by creating problems in the economy of mainland Russia. 
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Growth of prices contributed by integration and ensuing rise in demand from Russia could be 
attributed to the positive development factors and at the moment it appears that these factors 
have reached its limits, while negative factors (problems emerging from legal status) just started 
to take their effect. In future latter could force prices to plunge if Russia and Ukraine will engage 
in a military conflict over peninsula or the control over it will be restored by Kiev. The second 
option is justified because it is contrarian to market expectations of increasing demand from 
mainland Russia, that drove prices that high – the rise in supply by 62% last year combined with 
decreased demand (REM Navigator, 2015) indicates lack of confidence from potential buyers. 
Along with the fact that even after a year inside Russian most of the deals in the sector were 
nominated in dollars (Pichuev, 2015) it reflects lack of buyers’ confidence. The issue of property 
rights remains solid – if the peninsula will become Ukrainian again there will be problem with 
the legal acknowledgement of deals and contracts signed during the period when peninsula was 
Russian. 
But with or without it, negative or positive economic developments in the mainland Russia 
would be immediately reflected by the sector on the peninsula. So far influx of Russian buyers 
and tourists have stimulated development of this sector, though it had a setback a year later – in 
the mainland Russia real estate is also considered to be a reasonable investment, so more growth 
could be expected based on speculations regarding Kremlin’s investment programs in the region. 
Among other factors and spillovers from these developments would be the intensification of 
ethnic conflict, which would be examined further. 
3.3.1 Construction and the effect on the Crimean Tatar community. Reports on the 
discrimination of Crimean Tatars in the period following the annexation (Thoburn, 2015; OSCE, 
2015, pp. 83-89; EP DROI, 2016), which included supposedly forced emigration of 10 000 
Tatars from peninsula to Ukraine (Brisiuck, 2015) are not surprising on the background of this 
group’s disapproval of the secession of Crimea from Ukraine (Kenarov, 2014). Crimean Tatar 
community did not change its stance on the subject after 2008 poll revealed that majority of 
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Crimean inhabitants would favor becoming part of Russia, while Tatar community was 
predominantly opposed to it (Razumkov Centre, 2008) and in the aftermath of annexation, 
according to polls, did not see any improvements in their life (Muhametshina, 2015), though 
their language was given official status on the peninsula soon after annexation. Official Russian 
experts have recognized Crimea as the region with the highest risk of ethnic tensions (CINK, 
2014, pp. 7-9), contrasting with relatively low levels in other regions of Russia (Ibid, p. 2), due 
to the confrontation between Russian majority of peninsula and Tatar minority.  
Most of the disputes  revolve around the question of the redistribution of land (Okrest, 2015), 
which is the distant consequence of historical cataclysms: during WWII Crimean Tatars were 
deported after being accused of treason (Uehling, 2004, pp. 37-41) and lost their traditional lands 
and property. At the moment of rehabilitation and the subsequent repatriation of this ethnic 
group in 1980’s which cost Ukraine $300 million in reparations (Ibid, p. 42) satisfactory 
outcome became questionable as most of the land already belonged to other owners and it proved 
to be impossible to get land for resettlement by legal means (Ibid, pp.209-210). Because of that, 
repatriates started to seize the land and construct homes without permission (Ibid, pp. 211-230). 
Squatting and land grabs became the part of everyday economic reality by the turn of the 
century, as increasing number of repatriates started to obtain more and more land, which had 
questionable legal status (Kermenchikli, 2015). Land and the related construction business were 
the industries with the highest margin in 2000s (Guchakova and Klimenko, 2012 - 3) as wealthy 
Russians were investing in the land and real estate on the peninsula (Segodnya.UA, 2013) – in 
such circumstances scarcity of usable land, typical trait of many other island economies, had to 
provoke tensions with Crimean Tatars, who were the main obstacle for highly corruptive 
construction business even without political factor. Last Ukrainian Prime-Minister of Crimea 
Anatolii Mohyliov had a long history of conflicts with Crimean Tatars, all of which were 
somehow connected to the distribution and use of land (RIA Novosti, 2011; Livanov, 2011; Milli 
Firka, 2013), once even resorting to the extensive use of force, when Ukrainian special forces 
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were used to disperse and close down market, illegally organized by Crimean Tatars (News.Ru, 
2007). It is questionable, of course, how intense pressure on Crimean Tatars would be if the 
peninsula remained the part of Ukraine, but overall direction of this conflict was the same, as 
Ukrainian elites were heavily involved in the land schemes and construction business – such as 
Ukrainian ex-minister of defense and former MP Parliament from the Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko 
Pavel Lebedev, who  has built large construction company «Parangon» in Crimea when the 
peninsula was the part of Ukraine (Bezramkov, 2015)  and maintains his business activities 
already within Russian economic and legal framework (Nikiforov, 2015). At the moment, he is 
the vice-president of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs.  
Dynamics of land distribution remains regional matter, where local specifics determine further 
deterioration of the conflict more than federal policy: Russian president Vladimir Putin have 
signed law, which would allow Crimean Tatars to legalize their territorial possessions in the first 
months following the annexation and have announced repatriation and rehabilitation of this 
minority group as the part of bigger strategy of economic development of Crimea up to 2020 
(Birjukova, 2014), most likely in attempt to gain community’s trust – the policy Kremlin 
attempted to pursue in beginning (Luhn, 2014). However, by March 2015 12000 Crimean Tatars 
still lived on the seized land in illegally built housing – there was no change in their status 
(Shevchenko, 2015). New, Russian Prime Minister of Crimea Sergey Aksyonov insisted on the 
eviction of tenants and demolition of property, because regional legislation regarding 
legalization of seized land (which was passed half a year after Putin’s decree) made it extremely 
difficult to legalize the land for its current tenants due to the complex rules and eligibility criteria 
for candidates, which de-facto excluded from the candidate list over 70% of the tenants (Ibid). 
Area covered by illegal housing is estimated to be around 1.4 thousand hectares (RIA Novosti, 
2015 – 3) – and most of it is expected to be brought down by the authorities. Case of Crimean 
Tatars is basically similar to the cases of other minorities from the integration and disputed 
territories examples we have studied. Though Tatars were not a privileged minority group under 
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Ukraine, but like other minority groups from countries, that underwent transition (legal or 
illegal) – they were first to lose from the change of political environment.  
3.4 Manufacturing. This sector has suffered moderate contraction. By the end of 2014 output 
decreased by 9.9% (MERRK, 2015, p. 10). Food manufacturing decreased by 20.7%. (MERRK, 
2015, p. 16-18), though fall in this sub-sector was not equal: production of meat products 
increased significantly, while production of alcohol halved and fishing industry collapsed as this 
part of sub-sector have lost the Ukrainian market, which consumed 90% of its products (FNEB, 
2015, p. 47-48). Chemical manufacturing decreased by 16.4% (MERRK, 2015, p. 20), machine-
building decreased by 11.7% (FNEB, 2015, p. 50; MERRK, 2015, p. 23). Not all of the sub-
sectors have shown bad performance in the first year after annexation: metallurgy and 
manufacturing of finished goods from metals grew by 27% (MERRK, 2015, p. 23). 
 
The index of industrial production. Source Ministry of economic development of Republic of 
Crimea http://minek.rk.gov.ru/ 
The factors, influencing it can be categorized as external, transitional and inherited. 
1) External factors – those, that were the result of actions of other actors and were out of 
hands of Crimean authorities: 
 Fall of demand from abroad and Ukraine – for example chemical industry was 
among the sectors most vulnerable to that change; 
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 Sanctions – one of the reasons of the fall in the trade and FDI. Players in different 
sectors  have to invent complicated schemes for export and acquirement of the 
sought technologies and equipment or simply face the fall in exports and 
production (Kostiaev, 2015): in the first group we could find oil and gas company 
«Chernomorneftegaz» had to buy needed equipment from «Siemens» through the 
third parties; in the second group there are alcohol makers, who used to export 
their products abroad and suffered decline in their revenues; 
 Increased energy costs – Crimean energy system can supply only 20-23% of 
energy needs on the peninsula, while being dependent on Ukraine (Kondratiev  
and Agibalov, 2014, pp. 28-31; MERRK, 2015, p. 28;). Since 2014 blackouts 
became the fact of everyday life (CP, 2015 – 2, p. 37; Olearchyk, 2015; RFE/RL, 
2016). Russian authorities prevented full-scale humanitarian crisis by moving 
mobile gas turbine power plants and diesel generators to peninsula, but their 
primary task was to ensure the functioning of social and military infrastructure 
(hospitals, airfields, railways etc.), not the business-related activities. Crimea is 
expected to join Russian energy system no earlier than in 2017. It is worth noting 
that at this moment Russia has a number of other isolated energy systems behind 
Ural – which is understandable in the light of its large distances. Crimean officials 
estimated the size of the damage, inflicted by energy blockade, to be around 2 
billion rubles (Construction.Ru, 2016 – 2). These estimations do not include 
losses Crimean enterprises have suffered from the inability to make their products 
and services in time; hence multiplication effect would be much greater. For 
example, installment and activation of diesel generators with the power of 750 
MW alone costs $10 thousand (Puzyrev, 2015), plus the costs of diesel oil and the 
work of the specialist. The blackout affected all other sectors, most visibly – trade 
and hospitality industry (Ibid.); 
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 The shortage of raw materials – some parts of the sector, most reliant on that 
(such as production of alcohol) suffered dramatic decline (MERRK, 2015, p. 17), 
while chemical industry needs water supplies from the Ukrainian mainland 
(FNEB, 2015, p. 41). The good example will be factory «Crimean Titan», owned 
by Ukrainian oligarch Dmytro Firtash's Group DF – it was receiving raw 
materials from Ukraine but was exporting its finished products to Russia. 
2) Transitional – inflicted by shifting from Ukrainian economic and legal framework to 
Russian one: 
 Changing to Russian legislation. All of the business working on the peninsula had 
to withdraw or register according to Russian legislation – and most of the 
enterprises did so (CP, 2015 – 3, p. 26). It is impossible to calculate expenditures 
enterprises had to face while allocating their time and resources for this process; 
however, it was still some « lightened » form of disruption from their everyday 
activities, as it brought additional paperwork and some uncertainty in their 
activities, which might have influenced their output. Before Russian annexation 
region had 54 thousand enterprises and 135 private entrepreneurs – in a year, their 
amount decreased 2,5 and 3,4 times respectively (Nikolaev, 2015). Large share of 
this was the result of nationalization or exodus of enterprises from Crimea, but 
some of this could be attributed to the challenges of attestation and re-registration.  
 State property ownership and nationalization – particularly in the part concerning 
property of the Ukrainian state (CP, 2015 – 3, pp. 19-21): railway, 141 
agricultural enterprises, 109 recreational facilities and some objects of smaller 
importance. This process has contributed to the erosion of private property 
institutions, importance of which we have discussed in the beginning of thesis. It 
might have long-term consequences as entrepreneurs from Russian mainland 
would find it difficult to engage in the demanding projects on the peninsula 
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because of the risks of the arbitrary expropriation of their property – which could 
also happen if the ownership of the peninsula would shift back and Kiev 
government would refuse to recognize their property rights; 
 Logistical switch – before 2014 most of Crimean exports  went to the Ukrainian 
port of Odessa, but after annexation it needed to switch to Kerch, the move that 
brought additional transition costs; 
 Inaccessibility of the financing – the number of banks shrunk, while the remaining 
ones are aiming more at servicing the basic needs of population, than loaning to 
farmers. 
3) Inherited – traditional illnesses of the sector, which were present there before annexation: 
 Need for modernization in order to gain greater competitive edge – the growth in 
manufacturing was already decreasing and almost came to a halt before 
annexation (MERRK, 2015, p. 10); 
 Ensuing need in generated demand from the mainland; 
 Low level of innovational activity; 
 Insufficient number of qualified workforce. 
In 2015 manufacturing grew by 35% - mostly due to increases in segments of the food 
production, extraction of valuable resources and electricity generation (KIA, 2015), Growth in 
these industries reflects overall crisis in the economy – disruptions in the supplies of food and 
electricity have increased demand for food products and energy supplies, from which local 
producers were bound to benefit. Growth in extractive industries was due to the development of 
the local oil and gas reserves, which are considerable: by 2013 peninsula was supplying itself 
with 82% of gas it needed, and the offshore oil reserves in the disputed Black Sea region were 
estimated to be about 435 million tons (Kondratiev and Agibalov, 2014, pp. 24). However, 
growth in this area was driven by blackouts and blockade – most of the produced gas is being 
consumed by the population, which needed it more often as ways for establishing gas supply 
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independent from Ukraine were sought (Ibid, p. 25). Yet, by the end of 2015 a tendency for the 
decrease of gas extraction emerged – 1.5 billion cubic meters were extracted in 2015, which is 
0.15 billion cubic meters less than in 2014: the most obvious explanation is stress from 
blackouts, which increased demand for gas-generated electricity (Karamanoglu, 2016). 
In future, the manufacturing on the peninsula will most likely re-orient to the Russian market due 
to the political incentives. Additional driver may be the expected surge in military contracts and 
shipbuilding in the near future. 
3.5 Agriculture. This sector is divided between two roughly equal parts: cultivation of plants 
and growing of livestock. Half of the output is generated by population in small private farming 
households (MERRK, 2015, p. 31). In 2014 sector had mixed results – cattle raising contracted 
by 2.9%, crop production increased by 2.1% (FNEB, 2015, p. 52), but the gains and losses were 
distributed unequally across segments of the sector: for example, while production of grain and 
leguminous cultures decreased by 11.5%, production of milk contracted by 6.6% (Ibid., p. 53). 
Factors influencing it:  
1) Combination of legal and transitional factors resulted in the disruption of water 
supply and trade. 
 North Crimean Canal is crucial for the regional irrigation and supply of 
drinking water – as it can be seen from the Map 1 Crimea remains dependent 
in this relation on Ukraine. The Canal used to supply peninsula with more 
than 80% of the water it needs (Hobson, 2014) and no equal substitute was 
found for the region after annexation. Partially that problem was solved by 
diverting the water from Biyuk Karasu river to Canal (RIA Novosti, 2015 – 
4), but the insufficient amount of water for irrigation remains a problem and 
it couldn’t leave the sector without any consequences. The problem is not 
being downplayed and was recognized by different official bodies such as he 
chairman of the Federal Committee for Water Economy and Melioration of 
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Crimea Igor Vail (Sobytiya.Info, 2014),  Minister of Natural Resources and 
Environment of Russia Sergei Donskoi (APK Inform, 2015) and a chairman 
of  Public environmental Council in Sevastopol Margarita Litvinenko 
(Krymr.ORG, 2016) – up to the date supplying of peninsula with water for 
drinking and irrigation comes from shifting resources from the one part of the 
region to another. In the first 1.5 years after annexation water consumption on 
the peninsula fell 5 times in comparison to 2013 levels (Crimea Inform, 
2015). The most of projects related to the establishment of water supply 
safety on the peninsula will start no earlier than in 2017 (Crimea Inform, 
2015 – 2), hence the problem is likely to persist, because all available local 
sources of water supply only 15-20% of the region’s needs (Kondratiev  and 
Agibalov, 2014, p. 35) This cannot be fully attributed to the simple logistical 
transition to Russia, because it was the international status of the region that 
led to the disruptions in water supply. For example, Singapore is also heavily 
dependent on Malaysia in its water supply (Zengkun, 2015), but since its 
secession was recognized by the mainland, it does not suffer from similar 
disruptions; 
 Limited access of the Crimean agricultural producers to the Ukrainian 
market;  
2) Inherited negative factors, that ensue from stagnation and degradation of 1991-2014 
period: 
 Inefficient use of irrigated land due to reduction in irrigation capacity. Though it 
was crucially important for the peninsula, Canal in 1990s has suffered contraction 
in its water supply capacity – by the 2014 it supplied peninsula with 1-1.2 billion 
cubic meters a year, which is almost 2 times lower than during Soviet peak times 
(Kondratiev  and Agibalov, 2014, p. 36). It should be noted that this decrease was 
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also influenced by the fall in a number of tourists, but as we have observed 
earlier, but agricultural sector also shrunk and the shortfalls in water supply 
became the factor that added to the transitional problems: reservoirs were not 
filled to the maximum and it decreased the ability of regional administration to 
soften the effect from the disruption of supply; 
  Results of 20 years recessions and stagnation in agriculture. Reduction of acreage 
areas, reduced crop yields, decrease in harvest and food production had a negative 
effect: in 20 years after independence harvest of fruits decreased 4 times, harvest 
of grapes 3 times and grain cultures more than 2 times, while overall size of 
acreage decreased by 39.1% - from 1198.8 thousand hectares to 729.6 thousand 
hectares (Kondratiev and Agibalov, 2014, p. 12; MERRK, 2015, p. 31-37). This is 
a long-term trend and its consequences couldn’t been reversed fast – especially 
not in the environment, burdened with a lot of external negative factors such as 
sanctions and disruption of water supply from Ukraine; 
 Prevalence of small house holdings in the structure of the sector. They are based 
on the physical labor and cannot use the modern expensive machinery. The latter 
was quite important – according to Crimean Agriculture Minister Nikolai 
Poliushkin before annexation every year Crimea used 700 combine harvesters 
from the mainland Ukraine (Poliushkin, 2014) and their working power is missing 
after annexation;  
 The low level of development in breeding and seed production – and resulting 
dependency on the import of the needed species and types from abroad or 
mainland Russia (FNEB, 2015, pp. 53-54). 
3) Constructional factors: 
 Property rights issues. Nationalization have affected relationships with 
existing and potential investors on the peninsula – some of them, like 
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Avangardco, one of the world’s largest egg producers had their assets 
nationalized and they try to gain compensation via court (Olearchyk, 2014). 
This fact undoubtedly shuns off not only foreign investors, but domestic ones 
as well – as we have stressed the importance of secured property rights for the 
very fact of economic development. 
 
 
Map 1. North Crimean Canal. It starts in Tavriysk (Kherson oblast) and ends in Kerch (Crimea). 
The overall fall in Crimean agriculture was not as big as it might have been because most of the 
consumption was already concentrated on the peninsula and the demand did not fell 
dramatically, so the sector was able to sustain without huge losses, though the prices for products 
have increased almost 30% in 2015 (Guild Hall, 2015). However, sector remains depressive and 
ascension to Russia could add to the list of problems increased competition with the renowned 
Russian agricultural players, such as Krasnodar Krai, which exports bulk of its agricultural 
products to the rest of Russia. In 2015 the crisis in the regional sector has led to the active 
intervention of producers from Kuban region to Crimean market (Liev, 2015). This problem is 
very likely to persist in future as agricultural producers from the mainland Russia are more 
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competitive than their Crimean counterparts, not least because of their advantage in the acreage: 
size of Krasnodar Krai’s arable lands is 3.9 million hectares – more than Crimea’s 1.8 million 
hectares (CP, 2015 – 2, p. 23). 
As for the food safety, in this aspect the local sector could not provide enough supply for 
Crimea’s needs – by September 2015 Ukrainian food made up around 40% of presented products 
in retail (Levinskaja, Himshiashvili and Galaktionova, 2015). This episode reflects difficulties of 
transition. However, blockade of peninsula started in September 2015 (Kopka, 2015; Polikanov, 
2015) did not cause peninsula to starve. 
6.5 billion rubles of investments into the development of peninsula’s water resources (CP, 2015 
– 2, p. 18) are scheduled to be dispersed till 2020, so the whole sector is very likely to suffer 
from the negative factors discussed from above in the foreseeable future. There are no huge 
development programs for the regions so far, so it is being kept on the optimum minimum 
subsistence levels by the non-decreasing local demand, generated in large part by seasonal 
factors, such as tourism. In theory, access to the internal Russian market with its abundance of 
consumers with relatively high purchasing power along with food embargo, later imposed by 
President Putin, should have boosted the sector in the region. But the starting conditions were 
unfavorable from the beginning and at the moment sector remains in the very difficult position, 
as it was acknowledged by the region’s Minister of agriculture Andrei Grigorenko (EurRus, 
2016). Some Ukrainian sources state that by the beginning of 2016 size of irrigated lands was 
only 13.4 thousand hectares, a tenfold decrease over 2 years (Sobytiya.Info, 2016). 
Any further development in the sector depends on the willingness of investors and producers 
from the mainland Russia to take part in the development of the Crimean agricultural sector – 
and the ability of the state to encourage such development with developing needed infrastructure. 
Natural prerequisites for entry are good (a lot of arable land) and the existence of SEZ might 
serve as additional incentive, but first major problems (such as lack of water for irrigation) have 
to be solved.  By the means of ensuring steady supply of the products to the peninsula, Kremlin 
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avoided the major food crisis and starvation in the region, but the costs of separation from 
Ukraine were too high not to take devastating effect on the sector’s performance.  
3.6 Transportation. Changes in this sector reflect changes in political sphere. In 2014 carrying 
capacity of airports increased almost 2.4 times in comparison to the levels of 2013 – up to 2.8 
million passengers (MERRK, 2015, p. 48). Share of automobile transport has also increased – in 
the first year of annexation it carried 50% of all passengers and 21% of all cargo (Ibid. p. 49), 
though the number of all cargos transported this way decreased by 38% - to 1499.3 thousand 
tons. Ferries, on average, carried 20000 people and 4000 passenger cars a day (MERRK, 2015, 
p. 50) and their cargo turnover increased by 36% (FNEB, 2015, p. 58). Overall in the first year 
after annexation the cargo transportation fell by 32.8% (FNEB, 2015, p. 57-58), rates of railway 
transportation (that used to carry about half of commercial cargo transportation on the peninsula) 
contracted by 52,3% (Ibid.). Passenger transport carried 233.3 million passengers, 14% less than 
in 2013 (FNEB, 2015, p. 59). In Sevastopol fall was roughly the same (Ibid., p. 59-60). The 
following factors were the most important in this process: 
1) External factors: 
 Separation from Ukrainian market hit the industries and sub-sectors most 
reliant on the railway transportation – tourism and raw material suppliers. 
Railways used to carry most of the tourists in Crimea before March 2014 (CP, 
2015, p. 11): most of the tourists used to come from mainland Ukraine, which 
is connected to peninsula by land and railways and the already discussed 
switch of visitors to other transportation routes have seriously tested the 
infrastructural capacity on the peninsula. For the suppliers railways was one 
of the principal routes of transporting their materials to and from Crimea 
which is reflected in the sharp drop in transportation of the following goods: 
cement - 92.2%, ferrous metal scrap - 54%, oil and oil products - 75.9%, grain 
and grinding products - by 75.5%, coal – 64.1%, construction materials - 
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55.7%, fluxes - 33.5%, industrial raw materials - 30.7%, chemicals and soda – 
23.7% (FNEB, 2015, p. 58). Since autumn 2014 Crimean residents are 
considered to be economic non-residents in mainland Ukraine (Klimenko et 
al., 2014) and that increases their transaction costs for those working in 
transportation sector; 
 Blockade of peninsula. It is hard to estimate the damage done by the «civil 
blockade» of Crimea, which started in September 2015. At its peak organizers 
managed to decrease the number of Ukrainian goods entering Crimea by 1/3 
(Interfax-Ukraine, 2015);  
 Direct damage from sanctions. Freight turnover in port of Sevastopol fell 95% 
(Kostiaev, 2015); 
 Disruption of foreign trade as ensuing consequence of the sanction. In the first 
year alone the exports of the region contracted by 70% (FNEB, 2015, p. 22). 
There was a strong increase in share of Asia and Africa in its structure, while 
the share of the US and CIS countries declined – it somehow reflects the 
results of vote in UN regarding annexation of Crimea, when countries from 
that regions voted against condemnation of Russia or abstained from voting 
altogether (Dolgov, 2014; UN, 2014). As other unrecognized territories 
Crimea tried to avoid sanctions by betting on re-export of its goods from 
Switzerland and Panama to US (FNEB, 2015, p. 22). New business 
environment complicated operations for the transporters, who already 
established commercial relationships with the counter-agents in US and EU 
and the closure of these markets in the result of sanctions have cost the 
industry dearly: one of the principal actors in the sector (38.1% of region’s 
foreign exports in the beginning of 2014), chemical manufacturing, has 
suffered 17-fold decrease of its exports in price terms – from $161 million to 
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$9.3 million (Ibid.). Products made by Crimea still make their way to the 
European and American markets, just like its counterparts in Transnistria and 
Israel’s territories on the West Bank, though in much smaller quantities than 
before and with more hurdles. Illicit nature of this trade and the permanent 
danger of disruption increase transaction costs for the players in the sector, 
thus complicating business environment for them and causing delays and 
shortening of activity. Some trade happens even between 2 parts of Cyprus, 
but it is estimated that the current trade is only a fracture of what it could have 
been under normal circumstances (Gokcekus et al, 2012). 
 
 
Changes in the structure of Crimea’s exports. Source: FNEB, 2015, p. 22 
2) Constructional factor: 
 Importance of illicit transactions increased. The blockade was incomplete: 
there were Ukrainian reports on the organizers letting the trucks to pass to 
Crimea for a certain fee (Groshі, 2015; Ilchenko, 2015) – this moment reflects 
one of the character traits of unrecognized entities – significant share of grey 
market and importance of illicit cross-border transactions. In fact, one of the 
reasons for the blockade was the large volumes of illicit trade (Gorodnichenko 
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and Talavera, 2015 – 2)  between annexed region and the Ukrainian mainland, 
which refused to recognize the new de-facto status of this territory: Ukrainian 
exports to Crimea reached $610 million in the first 8 months of 2015 alone 
and though the blockade from the land temporarily decreased the trade 
turnover and have put additional corruption transaction costs for suppliers and 
transporters on both sides of the border, it did not put an end to it. The trade 
between two parts of once unified state de-facto continues to that date, like in 
other unrecognized states – Transnistria (which trades with Moldavia) and 
others. Indirect confirmation of this fact would be the independent analysis of 
product prices in Crimea before, during and after blockade (Gorodnichenko 
and Talavera, 2015): the prices did not change dramatically during that period 
when the transport blockade hit the hardest, which implies that cargo carriers 
were still able to make their way to the peninsula by some other means. Of 
course it came at a price of increased transaction costs, associated with 
corruption, but nevertheless the blockade was not effective in the achieving 
full embargo – and as studied examples of unrecognized territories from our 
theoretical framework has demonstrated, some form of economic cooperation 
can take place even under the strictest sanctions. If Crimea’s legal status will 
not change in the years to come, such practices could become a routine and 
the part of institutional framework – like in Polish town of Nowa Huta, where 
during Communist times government was turning blind eye to the booming 
smuggling and black market, because there were no other ways to keep the 
economy of this region afloat (Janus, 1999). 
3) Transitional factor: 
 Lack of proper connection to the newly obtained Russian mainland causes 
lags in this sector. The disruption of access to the peninsula by land increased 
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pressure on the remaining transportation routes and it remains quite limited to 
that date despite all works for expansion of their carrying capacity. The Kerch 
Strait Bridge is expected to be opened no earlier than by the end of 2018 and 
its successful completion remains questionable because of geological situation 
in the region – tectonic shifts in the area where the bridge is being built will 
complicate its functioning in the future. Of course, land connection to Russia 
will increase trade turnover and tourist inflow and will altogether accelerate 
its integration with Russia, but it will still be under the threat of disruption, 
that might be caused by the natural disaster. 
4) Inherited factors: 
 Locked geographical positioning due to the being the small-island economy. 
As the territory that ceded from the only country, with which it shares border, 
Crimea was put into dangerous situation when it was unable to switch without 
losses to the logistics of the new mainland since the new  transportation routes 
failed to compensate the same tonnage and passenger carrying, provided by 
previously used land routes. Though the new border remains penetrable, this 
route is not used to the full capacity and it is unknown whether it will be used 
at the pre-annexation rates again. In other words, Crimean small-island 
economy is still dependent on its previous metropoly in logistical sense;  
 Quality of infrastructure. Most of the existing infrastructure on the peninsula 
was built in 1940-1950s (CP, 2015 – 2, p. 32), hence it needed modernization 
already at the moment of market transition. Insufficient funding in 1990s did 
not improve the overall situation and by the moment of annexation Crimea 
had lower quality of infrastructure than most of the Russian regions, which 
forced Russia to invest billions of rubles in its maintenance and reconstruction 
(Ibid., pp. 33-36). 
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Though the traffic from abroad has shrunk rapidly due to sanctions, there was still considerable 
presence of foreign transporters. For example, during the first year after annexation Crimea was 
visited by 94 ships from 14 different countries, including 4 NATO members – Greece, Turkey 
(Klimenko, 2015), Romania and Germany (Klimenko, 2014).  
Up to the date transportation sector was going through severe crisis, caused by the problem 
discussed above. The completion of the Kerch Strait Bridge is meant to solve most of the 
problems – new roads and railways are expected to be built after its completion to carry 
increased number of cargo and passengers. It could be expected that after completion of the 
bridge and the subsequent increase in infrastructural development and usage transportation sector 
will get back to the peak levels of Ukrainian period – Russian economy is still big enough to 
provide Crimea with what it had under Ukraine. The likelihood of bypassing those levels 
depends on 2 crucially important factors: 
1) Economic situation in the mainland Russia. It means not only the overall economic 
performance in the country, which will affect internal market fluctuations towards 
Crimea, but also availability of huge funds, needed, first, to build the sought 
infrastructure and, second, to keep it in the states appropriate for using – because Crimea 
is over-dependent on federal financing and cannot ensure funding of such projects on its 
own; 
2) Sustainability of the Russian-built infrastructure in the face of two kinds of disruptions: 
natural ones and external. First means landscape challenging the bridge construction. 
Second are revolving on the situation in Ukraine, which means not only willingness of  
the government in Kiev to accept secession of the region, but also about possibility of 
other Ukrainian actors to intervene – for example, civil blockade was performed by  
nongovernmental actors from «The Mejlis of Crimean Tatar People». There is a huge 
possibility that other groups from Ukraine or loyal to it would choose to sabotage the 
infrastructure on the peninsula at their own initiative – autumn and winter of 2015 have 
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shown that Crimea is still vulnerable to that kind of actions. It is quite possible that 
representatives of the Crimean Tatar community on the peninsula would choose to 
participate in that process much more actively, thus bringing more militant element to 
existing strife. 
3.7 Banking and finances. Combination of external factors related to the legal status of Crimea 
and transitional issues accompanying its integration resulted in a halt in lending, decrease in a 
number of banks and overall crisis in this sector. 
This is one of the sectors, where transitional and external factors hit the hardest. Shortly after 
annexation Russian legislative body quickly passed law, obliging all banking institutions 
working in Crimea to obtain operating license from Russian regulators (Federal Law №37, 
2014). Later, Ukrainian central banking authority issued decree, forbidding banks registered in 
Ukraine to operate in Crimea and made it known that the banks, that will stay there will have 
their banking license revoked in Ukraine (NBU №260, 2014). Cumulative effect of both laws 
was so strong that not only the Ukrainian banks started to withdraw from peninsula 
(Mereminskaja, 2014), but their Russian counterparts as well – because they were afraid to lose 
the bigger market of integral mainland Ukraine (Gubar, 2014; Krasnova and Verzhbickij, 2014). 
Foreign banks and their subsidiaries have left Crimea shortly after annexation due to the effect of 
two laws – among them were Credit Agricole Group, Reiffeisenbank, Piraeus Bank, BNP 
Paribas, Unicredit bank and OTP Bank (CP, 2015 – 2, p. 16) 
Refusal of processing companies Visa and MasterCard to work in Crimea along with 
unavailability of international processing system SWIFT complicated banking operations and 
has increased reliance on operations with cash (Walker, 2015). Later, by the end of 2015 Russian 
government has found a way to bypass this and process Visa and MasterCard payments through 
newly established National Payment Card System (NPCS) which meant to establish financial 
independency of Russia (Ostroukh, 2015) it became possible to process Visa and MasterCard 
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payments through NPCS and those banks, that have reached settlement with the international 
processing systems (Eremina, 2015, 2016).  
However, major Russian banks did not establish their presence on the peninsula and by February 
2016 only a handful of banks continued to operate in Crimea. It is clear that they aim for internal 
Russian market or Crimea specifically and unlike major Russian banks, they don’t have any 
interests abroad (Ideagram, 2016). In other words, after 2014 banking sector of Crimea exists 
primarily to establish the optimum minimum service level for the basic needs of population 
(infrastructure for processing salaries and social payments) and the existing business activity in 
the region. Under normal circumstances the number of banks would be much bigger. An indirect 
confirmation of this would be regulator’s concern over the regional expansion of «Genbank» on 
the grounds of criminal records of one of its shareholders, who allegedly participated in illegal 
cashing schemes (Pismennaya  and Reznik, 2016) – the latter usually served as preamble before 
Russian Central bank revokes license from a certain bank. 
Multiple legal hurdles, which included new registration procedures and implementation of 
Russian legal norms led to the massive disruptions (Ovchinnikova, 2015, pp. 22-23) in banking 
activity. At first glance it appears that geo-political factor was principal, but in reality specifics 
of ascension to the Russian legal financial field has also contributed to the process: during first 
year of integration Russian Central Bank was actively revoking licenses from Crimean banks 
(Batalov, 2014). It could be argued how politically motivated these actions were if not the same 
tendency became apparent in mainland Russia well before annexation took place – from July 
2013 to the December 2013 Russian Central Bank revoked 35 banking licenses (Stroz Friedberg, 
2015) and this policy continued well into the present. It is true that international law issues have 
influenced decision of Russian major banks to abstain from establishment of long-term presence 
in Crimea, but there can be no doubt that even if annexation of Crimea received full international 
recognition, Russian Central bank would continue to close banks in Crimea, continuing its 
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consolidation policy in sector – under these circumstances existence of more than one hundred 
banks in such a small region would get questioned by the regulator in any case.  
The situation with the banking sector on the peninsula is better reflected in the case of the 
region’s largest bank – Russian National Commercial Bank (RNKB). After their withdrawal, 
major Russian banks handed their local operational offices to RNKB (CP, 2015 – 2, p. 17). 
Before the annexation of the peninsula RNKB was 609
th
 in the Russian list of banks. Its rise to 
prominence started with Crimean annexation when it almost fully focused on the banking 
activities in the new region, occupying the niche (Hobson, 2014 – 2) and growing 3000% over 
the period of just 2 years (Volkova et al., 2016), effectively becoming an irreplaceable financial 
institution on the peninsula. Before the annexation, bank belonged to the Bank of Moscow, but 
shortly after it the ownership shifted to the new Crimean administration. After this the bank 
concentrated on the provision of the essential financial services to the population, maintaining 
important social function rather than acting out of the commercial interests. In the beginning of 
2016 the bank has switched ownership again as it became property of Russia's federal state 
property agency – and by that time it was 90
th
 banking institution the country out of total 700 
(AFP, 2016) – that reflects its technical politicized nature. 
To sum up, we will say that this sector suffered huge contraction and shrunk to the minimum 
optimum state, sufficient for provision of basic financial services to the population. 
3.8 Telecommunications. This sector is also model in a sense, that it shows negative 
implications of Crimea’s international status.  
In April 2014 Russian company «Rostelecom» constructed its own underwater fiber optic 
communication line through Kerch strait, connecting Crimean communications system to the 
Russia, bypassing providers that became foreign after annexation (CP, 2015 – 2, p. 27). 
Integration in the Russian legal and technical framework went smooth – in the first 6 months 
Ukrainian companies even continued to work on the peninsula, but later their services were 
suspended (Ibid., p. 28) – most likely due to the intensification of the conflict in Donbass. 
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Ukrainian companies were quickly replaced by the newly established Crimean bodies such as 
«Intertelecom» (independent company, based in Simferopol) and «K-Telecom» (Sergina, 2015) 
– scenario that was realized in the financial sector, where new banking institutions were quickly 
reinstated on the place of the old ones to guarantee access of the population to vital services.  
 But later the lags in the development of the sector began to emerge as the biggest Russian 
mobile providers became reluctant to engage in business on the peninsula due to the 
complications they could face in the mainland Ukraine where they have subsidiaries. On the 
contrary, major Russian providers of the fixed telephony, TV/radio and broadband Internet 
access have entered the regional market without fear (CP, 2015 – 2, pp. 29-30). 
Hence the development of the sector was determined by the same set of factors that accompany 
economies of disputed territories: 
1) External factor – Ukrainian sanctions, that forced major Russian companies to pull out 
from peninsula like their counterparts from banking industry did. Ukrainian laws make it 
possible to persecute companies, that somehow compromise Ukrainian territorial 
integrity and safety – and that makes work in annexed Crimea a highly risky enterprise 
(Salmanov, 2015). «MTS» has sold all of it equipment to «K-Telecom» (Salmanov, 
2016) – the move, similar to the one, major Russian banks did with the transfer of their 
local branches to RNKB. Major Russian mobile communications companies shunned 
from working in Crimea (CP, 2015 – 2, p. 28), which is a good indicator of incomplete 
integration;  
2) Constructional factor – Crimea uses workarounds to provide sought services. In that case 
it is work of Russian company MTS, which still operates in the region, distributing 
mobile and Internet connection from the neighboring Krasnodar, which makes its 
operations on the peninsula look compliant with international and Ukrainian laws. 
However, such moves bring additional transaction costs, such as keeping technical 
roaming – and that makes development of the territory to lag.  
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In telecommunications Crimea lags behind the absolute majority of the Russian regions, because 
factors discussed above constrain development of this industry. In future further development of 
this sector will be determined by how the local business and administration will be able to 
overcome factors discussed above. Kremlin was able to find substitute for optimal minimum 
level of development, when locals will be ensured with an access to the services of acceptable 
quality. However, this quality is deeply inferior to the standards on mainland Russia, where 
companies are reluctant to provide region with their funding and technologies, because their 
business interests abroad may suffer.  
Summary. After annexation manufacturing, transportation and agriculture have suffered the 
most considerable drops because of the separation from Ukraine and the factors ensuing from the 
region’s legal status – most notably fall of exports, decrease of demand and sanctions. This 
coincided with the negative trends already present in these sectors and Crimean economy in 
general and has added to the overall decrease – the features of small island economy overlaid 
with the features of disputed territory. Banking and telecommunications have suffered the most 
as effect of sanctions reduced the activity to the minimum and functioning in the area exists 
primarily due to the direct or indirect governmental support. Real estate sector is the only one 
which enjoyed huge growth on the speculative promises of the growth, fueled by the investment 
from the Russian mainland. 
Sanctions and lack of proper connection to the Russian mainland are preventing complete 
integration of the region in Russian economy. Sanctions keeps major Russian banks and 
companies from doing business on the peninsula, which questions level of economic integration 
of the peninsula – this region cannot be fully considered part of the country in economic sense if 
legitimate economic actors shun from engaging in direct economic activities there. The 
infrastructural issues make Crimean economy over-dependent on the supply of crucial resources 
from Ukraine, the country which is not acknowledging the loss of the territory and hence is 
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acting in the disruptive way. In this sense, Crimea is much more fully integrated in Russia in 
political dimension, rather than in economic one. 
The contraction in many industries and the ongoing crises related to the separation from Ukraine 
are showing that the poor quality of institutions in the region have deteriorated even further. 
Crimea’s illegal status encourages establishment of what Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) have 
called «extractive institutions», which do not encourage healthy economic development. Massive 
recession and hypothetical humanitarian catastrophe were prevented by ad hoc interventions by 
Russian central state – which also indirectly hints at the level of dysfunction of the institutions, 
existing on the peninsula: the ad hoc intervention from the Russian mainland (also in the form of 
subsidizing) is arguably the only thing that keeps the regional economy afloat. 
Based on some growth evidences in particular sub-sectors and the expected investments, which 
in large part will come sometime after full infrastructural convergence of the region with the 
mainland Russia, we can expect gradual recovery and the growth of the peninsula’s economy. 
This model of economic development will largely resemble FRG’s experience in integrating 
former GDR – politically motivated subsidization policy, which is not aiming at making the 
region self-sufficient, but at maintaining the social stability in region and narrowing the gap 
between more developed and less developed regions. With respect to Russian experience in 
regional development, still underdeveloped region like Dagestan may be the good example: in 
the period of 1999-2009 generous subsidization the region did not become economically self-
sufficient, but increased its GRP, living standards and employment rates (Zubarevich, 2009, p. 
15). Even without the constraints of the illegal status Crimean economy was over-dependent on 
the mainland in economic sense, but under current circumstances such dependency is likely to 
strengthen.  
Poor quality of local governing institutions will lower positive effect from the Russian 
investments, but the Russian regional development experience demonstrates that money for such 
projects are distributed out of political considerations, thus giving little importance to increasing 
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costs and questionable effectiveness of such method of allocation of funds. The same should be 
expected in the case of Crimea. 
These findings are consistent with what we have examined in our theoretical framework: 
 Economic integration: in the process of developing Crimea Kremlin have confirmed the 
ideas of Mattli (1999) and Rosamond (2000) that the primary conditions for economic 
integration are political commitment and willingness to invest huge resources in this 
process. Policies from the examples of FRG and India, as well as from EU cohesion 
policy experience (Leonardi, 2004; Molle, 2008) are reminiscent of those we have seen in 
Crimea – generous investments for the sake of convergence of the region with the 
integrating country; 
 Small island economies: Crimea did not change its nature (being over-dependent on the 
mainland) in that respect; the region just changed the mainland patron – from Ukraine to 
Russia. Thus, Crimea is still resembling models of development, studied by Briguglio 
and McElroy, as well as others, who did research in this area; 
 Disputed territories: findings confirm Riegl’s (2014) argument about negative trajectory 
of development of unrecognized states – the legal status of Crimea has affected 
development of the peninsula to the worst. In the process, the economic development of 
Crimea took shape similar to the other relevant disputed territories we have discussed in 
theoretical framework and was influenced by the same set of factors. It has also put limits 
on the integration of Crimea in Russia; 
 Institutions: on the example of Crimea we have observed that the overall low quality of 
governing institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2013) and the lack of security of 
property rights (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005) serve as a negative factor. In addition to 
that we can state that the low quality of «institutional factors» such as skills, quality of 
infrastructure and others increase overall negative effect (Rodríguez-Pose, 2013; Siddiqui 
and Ahmed, 2013). Legal status of Crimea, as we have expected from studying the theory 
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(Olson, 2000; Varese, 2005), have affected region’s institutions significantly and resulted 
in the development of the informal and illicit economic institutions, which usually appear 
in the case of troubled transition. So, in Crimea the integrating country has to deal with 
the economically underdeveloped region with the very low quality of institutions; 
 Russian regional development: Kremlin did not make any changes in local institutions 
and instead of focusing on the developing long-term development agenda, it rather 
concentrated on the investments and provision of vital services for the period of 
connecting the region with the rest of Russia. This is consistent with our conclusions 
from that part of the framework, most vividly examined by Zubarevich (2009): the region 
is improving its social-economic indicators while remaining over-dependent on the 
financing from the center, which cares more about maintaining social stability, than about 
building sustainable and self-sufficient economy. This development pattern is also 
consistent with Crimea’s model of small island economy, and with the notion of Russia 
being the country with huge regional economic divergence (Lehmann and  Silvagni, 
2013). 
Conclusion 
After collapse of the Soviet Union Crimea’s economy shrunk and stagnated, while the periods of 
recovery growth were insufficient and short. 
The core problem was that in its economic nature Crimea was small island economy, which 
depends on the mainland in most respects. The more rich the mainland is – the more positive 
effects Crimean economy will enjoy, and the opposite. In 1990s and 2000s Crimea was just as 
dependent on Ukraine as it was on USSR, but obviously Ukrainian economy could not offer the 
same. Long-term negative economic developments and deterioration of institutions in Ukraine 
had an effect on Crimean economy and led to the structural misbalances in many sectors. The 
degradation of Crimea’s economy becomes even more evident when the region is being 
compared to the neighboring Krasnodar Krai, which had the different trajectory of economic 
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development. The reasons for that is the bigger size of the Russian market; relatively higher 
(though not especially) quality of institutions in Russia; delayed privatization in Crimea itself. 
Ascension of the region to Russia did not solve the principal problem. There is a hypothetical 
possibility that generous Russian subsidies will give a boost to local economy, but at the moment 
Crimean economy suffered and contracted because of transition. The status of disputed territory 
puts constraints on Crimea as sanctions and the conflict in Ukraine are affecting its performance 
in the negative way, combining with the already present negative features of underdeveloped 
post-Soviet economy. Additional weight is pulled by the poor quality of institutions, which 
remain unchanged. 
However, the real economic development of the region will not start until the acceptable level of 
infrastructural connection will be established – it should be expected by the end of this decade. 
In that case there is a good potential for recovery and further development, because Russian 
economy offers Crimea more possibilities – especially when this growth is stimulated by the 
generous subsidies from the mainland.  
So far economy of Crimea did not reach the full integration with Russia because of sanctions and 
infrastructural problems – both issues are preventing Russian business and consumers to engage 
in economic activity with Crimea as much as they could engage with other Russian regions. 
Crimea’s development will largely depend on the possibility and willingness of Kremlin to put 
an effort and money in this project – like successful integration and development of Eastern 
Germany still depends on FRG’s ability and readiness to do that at its expense.  
Based on the Russian experience in regional economic development and the problems regional 
economy faces today, it will be safe to conclude that Russia will not seek to make Crimea fully 
self-sufficient and developed, as it would demand much more effort than could be expected – but 
rather will keep it on a lifeline of the subsidies like many other Russian regions (such as in North 
Caucasus), which otherwise would be totally depressive in economic sense.  
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Future researches on this subject could confirm or disprove our hypothesis that Crimea is likely 
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